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Abstract 
This paper provides a broad analysis of the effect of the current financial crisis on global equity 
markets and their major components. We also examine the magnitude of the crisis in terms of value 
destruction in comparison to other market crashes. In brief, upon looking at return performance 
across an array of regions, countries, and sectors, broad market averages are down approximately 
40% on their end of 2006 levels.  While deterioration started in most markets in early to mid 2008, 
the crisis period of mid September to the end of October 2008 is responsible for the lion's share of 
the collapse with just about all indices falling 30 - 40% in this short period.  Financial sectors have 
taken a bigger hit than non-financials over the period, though they both suffered similarly during the 
peak of the crisis.  Due to larger rises in 2007 the emerging markets drop more in 2008 than devel-
oped markets but in large part end up at the same level as the other markets. The global nature of 
the crisis is also apparent from the high correlations between markets and investment styles that fur-
ther increased during the crisis.  As a result, diversification provided little help to investors when 
needed most as markets dropped in tandem. 
 
1 Introduction 
At the beginning of October 2007, despite the tremors from early August, world equity markets meas-
ured at an all-time high USD market capitalization.  According to Thomson’s DataStream data, global 
equity markets had a market capitalization of more than $51 trillion as of this date.  What happened over 
the next 17 months is nothing short of the largest destruction of equity value in history.  By the end of 
February 2009, global equity market capitalization stood at just over $22 trillion, a drop of more than 
56% and a reduction in equity value of more than $29 trillion.  This loss in wealth to equity holders is 
equivalent in value to about 50% of global GDP for 2007. 
While financial crises are not a new phenomenon (see e.g., Allen and Gale (2007) and Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009)), the current financial crisis differs from many of the previously studied crises in that 
it is both severe and global.  Although a major banking crisis (although not necessarily a global one as 
we shall see later), it has become a global financial market crisis.  In the era of global markets and global 
investing, this crisis has challenged investors’ recently gained perceptions about equity investing.  The 
crisis has driven down equity levels across the globe, and in nearly every country, sector and industry.  
As a result some investors have been questioning previously held beliefs about the risk of equity invest-
ing and the benefits of global diversification.  In the midst of this hand wringing, the purpose of this 
paper is to provide a detailed factual backdrop on how equity markets have behaved during a period en-
compassing the global financial crisis, ending in February 2009.  To do this we will look at equity per-
formance in a series of steps.  First we will document the behavior of the global equity market since the 
beginning of 2007 focusing first on returns but also on volatility.  When possible we will link significant 
economic or policy events from the crisis to the market reactions.1  We also investigate the breadth of 
the market decline by looking at different regional markets to see how widespread the collapse has been.  
We then try to put some historical perspective on the magnitude of the current decline by comparing it 
to previous declines in the long history of U.S. market returns.  We also attempt to provide some crude 
economic analysis on the relative role of declining cash flow forecasts and increasing risk premia under-
lying the large drop in equity values.  Since the financial sector was ground zero for the crisis, we then 
examine the performance of the financial sectors versus the non-financial sectors as well as look at some 
evidence on the impact of the market turbulence on some basic style portfolio investing performance.  
                                                 
1 For this purpose we provide a timeline of critical financial crisis events in an appendix. 
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Finally we look at the impact of the crisis on return volatility measures and correlations both across re-
gions and across sectors. 
The basic story that will arise is that while the mortgage and banking crises have been ongoing 
since early 2007, the equity market reaction was basically second order until July/August 2008, and the 
real equity market action (collapse) starts in the middle of September 2008 with the bankruptcy of Leh-
man and the bailout of AIG.  From September 15 through late October nearly everything fell sharply.  
The impact was universal and severe. For most indices, these 32 trading days contain the majority of the 
decline for the year.  By the end of 2008, with few exceptions, most equity indices were at 50% or less of 
their end of 2006 levels, and down 60% from their highs.  Unfortunately, despite all of the financial ad-
vice about diversification, in this crisis equity investors had no place to hide. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the overall market performance, while 
Section 3 tries to put the current market decline in historic perspective and attempts to decompose the 
decline into cash flow and risk premium effects.  Section 4 looks at differences in equity performance at 
the financial sector relative to the non-financial sectors.  Section 5 zooms in on performance at the ma-
jor industry level, and Section 6 takes a look at performance within the financial industry that is at the 
heart of the crisis.  Section 7 evaluates the impact of the crisis on some simple style portfolios, while 
Sections 8 and 9 focus on the behavior of market volatility and correlations. Finally, Section 10 summa-
rizes and concludes. 
2 Overall Market Performance 
We begin by looking at the world equity market index to gauge what happened on average across the 
markets.  Figure 1a shows the total return index of the DataStream world market portfolio measured in 
USDs from the beginning of 2007 to the end of February 2009.  A summary of the total return behavior 
(including dividends and share repurchases, but without adjustment for taxes) would say that world eq-
uity markets were up in 2007 about 15% and then gave back that gain in a choppy ride over the first 6–8 
months of 2008.  Then, starting in September 2008, during the crisis period of the credit crunch (the 
crisis period being defined for our purposes as the close of markets on Friday September 12 to the close 
of trading on Monday October 27) the index fell precipitously, losing 36.8% over these 32 trading days.  
Since then the world market portfolio has recovered and lost about 10% of its value twice, and then 
stumbled downward into 2009 ending February 2009 at its lowest level of the period, down 45.4% since 
the end of 2006, 52.6% since the end of 2007, and 16.5% since the end of 2008. 
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The timing and the severity of the crisis over the 26-month period we examine can be seen 
clearly by looking at a plot of the rolling 30 day (annualized) volatility of world market portfolio in Fig-
ure 1b.  Using this measure, “normal volatility” would appear to be around 10-12% on an annualized 
basis.  There were several episodes in 2007 and the first part of 2008 where volatility rose temporarily 
above this level.  Several of these events were treated at the time as major disruptions of normal market 
behavior, especially the August 2007 market crisis triggered by a sudden tightening of credit that ended 
up squeezing many of the quantitative hedge funds, forcing them to sell equities to provide liquidity.  
While a crisis at the time, in retrospect, it and the other events pale in comparison to what happened in 
the fall of 2008.  The timing of the onset of the major crisis in the equity markets is clearly evident.  
While volatility had been low in August 2008, it had started to rise by the beginning of September.  We 
note in the chart the location of September 15, 2008, the day that Lehman Bros files for bankruptcy af-
ter failing to find a buyer (as Bear Stearns had done in March).  This and the events that followed over 
the next 30-35 days clearly define a global equity market in crisis.  Volatility rose to nearly four times its 
normal level and three times higher than the highest levels seen in the previous 18 months.  In looking 
at the chart it is hard not to define a period from mid-September through the end of October that marks 
the heat of the crisis.  During this period price volatility was skyrocketing, and as we can see from Figure 
1a, index levels were falling dramatically.  As market index collapse slowed at the end of October, rolling 
volatility peaked in early November 2008, and then fell, almost as quickly as it had risen, not quite to 
“normal” levels, but to levels that were about two times the pre-crisis levels.  In line with this decline in 
volatility, the global equity market stabilized somewhat, but the collapse that had been triggered by the 
credit crisis turned into a fear of a real demand crisis, and equities continued to decline, albeit at a more 
measured pace.  A full set of returns statistics for the DataStream World Market index are provided in 
Table 1. 
Regional market indices experienced a similar pattern of performance, though pre-crisis per-
formance was dramatically different between Developed Markets and emerging markets.  Figure 3 plots 
the total return index for three major DataStream regional markets: the United States, the Developed 
Markets excluding North America (similar to MSCI's EAFE), and the Emerging Markets.  The United 
States and the Developed Markets ex North America show an amazingly similar pattern (in terms of 
performance in USD) over the 26 months, with the Developed Markets ex North America ending down 
slightly more for the period (-47.5%) than the U.S. market (-44.3%).  The decline in 2008 for both mar-
kets is largely due to the drop during the crisis period, when both markets dropped about 35%.  Despite 
the Developed Markets ex North America including exchange rate changes, the U.S. market has a higher 
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volatility measure in all periods.  Also, both markets are down more than 17% in the first two months of 
2009.  The wealth losses to each market are immense.  The U.S. market has given up over $9 trillion of 
market capitalization since its peak on October 9, 2007, with nearly half of this coming from the 32 trad-
ing days of the peak crisis.  The other Developed Markets (except Canada) lost almost $14 trillion of 
market capitalization since their peak on October 31, 2007, although the European portion of this is 
likely overstated due the currency movements of the last half of 2008. 
The Emerging Markets portfolio performs rather differently, at least in the first part of the pe-
riod.  It experiences a significant rise in 2007 (up 43.6%), and stays up around this level through June 
2008, before starting a steep decline to end 2008 down 54.4%, with 45.9% of this decline occurring in 
the 32-day crisis period.  The loss of wealth in emerging equity markets is also staggering, with more 
than $5.2 trillion lost since these markets peaked on October 30, 2007.  In this case, only about 50% of 
this loss occurs during the peak crisis period, consistent with the fact that the Emerging Markets started 
their rapid decent somewhat before the crisis began, giving back most of the 2007 gains prior to Sep-
tember 1, 2008.  So far in 2009, the Emerging Markets are down 11.2%, but this is notably less than the 
Developed Markets.  By the end of our sample period, all the equity markets in all three regions are 
down to about 60% of the end of 2006 levels.  Somewhat surprisingly, despite these large movements 
and some significant currency adjustments, the Emerging Markets portfolio shows generally less volatil-
ity over the period than the U.S. Market portfolio.  Detailed statistics for these series are displayed in 
Table 2. 
The equity market reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-09 is one in which equity markets 
worldwide have suffered a serious decline, and to a first approximation at least, by similar amounts rela-
tive to levels at the end of 2006.  An obvious question at this point is how bad is this market decline 
compared to previous equity market declines?  Since the declines in value are relatively comparable 
across regions we will examine this question by comparing the recent U.S. market decline to previous 
large down markets in the long history of returns of the S&P 500 index. 
Looking at the standard Ibbotson data from December 1925 – present, the U.S. market, repre-
sented by the S&P 500 index, has experienced ten market declines of more than 20%.  Table 3 shows 
the dates and the decline from market peak to bottom for each of these 10 events.  Following the mar-
ket peak in September 2007, the current down market (continuing to run through the end of February 
2009) has dropped 54.1% and is the second largest decline for the S&P 500 index in this sample period.  
The current decline is surpassed only by the market decline at the outset of the Great Depression, where 
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34 months after the peak in August 1929, the S&P 500 index had fallen 83.4%.  The current crisis is 
now slightly worse than the 13-month decline starting in February 1937 (-50.3%) and the 21-month de-
cline starting in December 1972 (-42.6%).  To compare it to a more recent crash, the 18-month S&P 
decline resulting from the bursting of the dot com bubble saw the market index decline just under 30%.  
Figure 3a plots the return index change from the peak for the market collapses listed in Table 3.  From 
this picture it is clear that while the current market decline is not the steepest or the fastest, it is the sec-
ond deepest, and it is currently outpacing the market decline at the start of the Great Depression. 
This market decline has had a significant economic consequence on the wealth of equity holders.  
In terms of just the S&P 500 stocks, the loss in market capitalization during the current decline is $7.2T, 
or roughly half the value of U.S. GDP in 2007.  With such an evaporation of wealth, it is not surprising 
that consumption and savings behavior have changed sharply in recent months.  The length of the cur-
rent market decline (through February 2009) is already longer at 17 months than the sample average of 
16.8.  Perhaps most concerning is the uncertainty with which the past gives us any idea of how long it 
will take for prices to return to their previous peak levels.  Omitting the initial Great Depression crash, 
the average number of months to return to peak is 44.4.  This would suggest that it will be midyear 2011 
before the S&P 500 is back at or above its 1,500 peak level.  Alternatively, one might argue that it is not 
right to disregard the Great Depression as an example, given the similarities in terms of the global na-
ture of the crisis and the severity of the economic contraction.  If the Great Depression market decline 
is the guide to how long until we return to the Fall 2007 price levels, history suggests that it will take 
over 15 years (from September 1929 until December 1944) to recover from the price decline and sur-
pass the previous peak level.  Applying this to the current situation would suggest that it will be until 
2022 until we see the S&P 500 back at or above 1,500. 
With such a significant decline in equity value over such a short period, especially the second 
half of 2008 through February 2009, one can ask what economic factor was the primary driver of the 
decline.  To answer this question, we need a model of equity valuation.  One of the most basic eco-
nomic models of equity valuation is the dividend discount model.  This model assumes that the value of 
an equity claim is the present value of the stream of future dividends provided to the holder of the 
claim.  The special case of this model, where we assume the expected dividends follow a growing perpe-
tuity process, predicts: 
)(
1
0 gr
DIVP −=  
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where P0 is the price of the equity claim today, DIV1 is the expected dividend (cash flow) to be received 
in one period (i.e., at the end of the year) by the equity holder, r is the (constant) required return on eq-
uity per period, and g is the constant periodic growth rate for dividends.2  In such a model, a sharp de-
cline in the value of equity will be the result of either a decrease in expected dividend DIV1, (due to re-
duced profitability), or an increase in the denominator, via an increase in the discount rate, r (due to a 
greater risk premium for equity risk) and or a decrease in the long run growth rate, g. 
To try to measure the relative importance of these two influences in the sharp drop in global eq-
uity markets over the out sample period, we consider an approach that derives from Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004).  They demonstrate that value stocks (those with high book to market ratios) are 
more sensitive to cash flow changes (dividends), while growth stocks (those with low book to market 
ratios) are more sensitive to discount rate changes.  Given this, it should be the case that the perform-
ance of a portfolio that is long value stocks and short growth stocks (therefore net of general market 
movements) relative to the movement of the overall market provides insight into which of these two 
factors is having the bigger impact on overall valuation.  If the long-short portfolio is falling during a 
overall market decline, then value stocks are falling more than growth stocks suggesting that the market 
decline is being driven more by a decline in expected dividends (cash flow effects) than in the discount 
rate.  If this portfolio is rising during a market decline, it suggests the market decline is driven more by 
increased perceptions of market risk and a resulting higher discount rate than by lower expected cash 
flows.3
As an investigation of this concept, Figure 3b shows the performance of the MSCI World Market 
index and a zero net investment portfolio that is long the MSCI World Market Value portfolio and short 
the MSCI World Market Growth portfolio.4  During the first 10 months of the period, the market port-
folio is generally rising, and the long-short portfolio is declining, suggesting that the market rise is being 
driven more by a decline in the discount rate rather than a rise in expected dividends.  Over the next 9 
months, both the market index and the long-short portfolio are declining, suggesting that the market 
                                                 
2 While this simplistic version of the dividend discount requires some heroic assumptions such as a single constant 
growth rate into perpetuity, which makes it overly simplistic for an individual firm, it is reasonable/better suited for a market 
portfolio in which the aggregate dividend growth rate is tied to the long run economy-wide growth rate. 
3 Of course the opposite pattern is true when the overall market is rising. 
4 The stocks in each portfolio are as determined by MSCI.  The amounts invested in the long and short side are 
never rebalanced. MSCI periodically adjusts the construction of the portfolios based upon on the changes in the characteris-
tics of the constituents. 
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decline is being driven by declining dividend expectations more so than an increasing discount rate.  But 
from late June 2008 through the end of the crisis period (October 27), the sharp market decline is asso-
ciated with a sharp rise in the long-short portfolio (value outperforming growth) suggesting that just 
prior to and during the height of crisis, discount rate factors played a more significant role in the market 
decline than declines in expected dividends.  However, once the peak of the crisis abates (end of Octo-
ber 2008,) there is a return to the earlier pattern in which the continued market decline through the end 
of the sample corresponds to a consistent decline in the long-short portfolio suggesting that fears of de-
clining dividends dominate over discount rate increases in driving the market move.  Overall, this ex-
periment suggests that discount rate effects were more significant during the run up to and in the peak 
crisis period, though in the other period of market decline lower expected dividends were the more the 
prevalent factor in driving the market decline over the entire period.5
3 Market Sector Performance 
As the epicenter of this current crisis is the financial sector, one would expect that financial sector equity 
took a harder hit than non-financials.  To investigate this question we assess the relative performance of 
the financial sector and the non-financial sectors of overall market portfolios.  This sectoral decomposi-
tion of a market portfolio is provided by DataStream.  For the overall world market portfolio we find, 
not surprisingly, that the financial sector has been much more negatively affected over the past 26 
months than the non-financial sector.  As the plot displayed in Figure 4 and the statistics in Table 4 sug-
gest, the financial sector return index (in USD) fell significantly more (-63.9%) compared to the non-
financial sector (-38.3%) over the sample period.  Moreover, the volatility of the financial sector returns 
is nearly 50% higher than the non-financial sector returns.  In 2007, while the non-financial sector of the 
world market was up nearly 20% in USD terms, the world financial sector performance was basically 
flat, and volatilities were basically comparable.  Looking at the financial sector performance in 2007 as 
displayed in Figure 4, one can note the drop in late July through mid August related to the quantitative 
                                                 
5 That both factors played a significant role in the market decline is confirmed by estimations on the S&P 500 index 
by the authors (not reported in the paper) using forecasts of dividends taken from the time value adjusted spread between the 
prices of futures and spot contracts.  Given the estimates of expected dividends at different points of time and the spot con-
tract value, we use the dividend discount model (assuming a constant dividend growth rate) to back out a discount rate esti-
mate.  Comparing the influence of the estimated decline in expected dividends over the subsequent 12 months and the in-
crease in the implied discount rate from the peak of the market in October 2007 until the end of the sample suggests that 
slightly more than half of the decline is due to increases in the discount rate.  This result is also consistent with the recent 
finding in Graham and Harvey (2009) suggesting that from their periodic survey of corporate financial officers there has been 
a significant increase in the estimate of the market premium (discount rate) for valuing future projects. 
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hedge fund crisis in which there was a liquidity squeeze following the liquidation of two large Bear 
Stearns funds.  Taken at the time to be a serious crisis, the global financial firms shook this off, rising 
through October 2007 and then beginning an inexorable and unprecedented decline, with minor respites 
in April and mid-July of 2008, falling 51.7% in 2008, punctuated by a sharp drop (40.5%) during the 
peak of the crisis from mid-September through the end of October.  The financial sector also fell 
sharply in the first two months of 2009, ending down 25.6%. 
In contrast to the financial sector, Figure 4 shows that the non-financial sector maintained its 
valuation through late spring of 2008, only then did it begin a decline that also saw it down 40.6% in 
2008 with a drop of 35.7% during the peak period of the crisis.  Although over the entire period the 
non-financial sector performed better than the financial sector, with the financial sector dropping to 
only 40% of its end of 2006 value and the non-financial sector dropping only to 60% of its end of 2006 
value, they fell by similar amounts during the peak of the crisis.  From Figure 4b, which plots the equity 
performance only since the crisis period, it is apparent that the performance of the two groups is very 
similar during the crisis and only in mid-November (11/12/2008) when the U.S. Treasury announced 
that they will not be purchasing securities with the TARP funds does financial sector performance fall 
below that of the non-financial sector. 
Comparisons of the financial sector and the non-financial sector for the three main regions, 
United States, Developed Markets ex North America, and Emerging Markets, shown in the plots in the 
three panels of Figure 5, reveal some notable differences in pattern.  In the United States, the financial 
sector clearly underperformed the non-financial sector over the entire sample period.  The financial sec-
tor suffered a notable 10% drop during the August 2007 credit squeeze, and although it gained back this 
loss over the next few months, it then fell about 70% over the next 16 months, to end February 2009 at 
only 30% of its end of 2006 level.  The U.S. non-financial sector held up until the crisis period in Sep-
tember 2008 when it gave up 32.3% which was nearly all of its entire loss for the 26-month period 
(35.9%).  In the other Developed Markets, the difference in performance between the financial and non-
financial sector is not as significant.  By June of 2008 the two series had already developed a 20% per-
formance gap (financials underperforming non-financials), and that gap grew slightly during the crisis 
period with financials dropping 41.7% and non-financials dropping 34.5%.  The financials sector ended 
the sample down 65% on the end of 2006 levels, about 25% more than the non-financial sector.  In the 
Emerging Markets, Panel C of Figure 5 shows that there is much less of a difference in performance 
between the financial and non-financial sectors.  Both sectors were up significantly in 2007, 36.4% for 
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financials and 46.2% for non-financials, as emerging markets were still hot.  Both sectors fell sharply in 
mid-January 2008 in response to the increased fears of a U.S. recession and dissatisfaction with the an-
nouncement of the first U.S. stimulus package of a mere $145B.  Both Emerging Markets sectors main-
tained value through the end of May 2008, they both started to slide after that, with the peak crisis pe-
riod being just the steepest section of a persistent 6-month decline that saw the financial sector lose 
more than 56% and the non-financial sector lose more than 61%, with more than 45 points of this loss 
occurring in the crisis period. As can be seen in the figure, over the entire sample period the Emerging 
Markets financial and non-financial sector lost roughly similar amounts, down 45% and 40%, respec-
tively. 
It is also interesting to visually compare the two sectors regionally.  A plot showing all six series 
is displayed in Figure 6.  Several things jump out from this presentation.  The series seem to initially 
bunch into three groups and then merge into two groups by the end.  The U.S. and Developed Markets 
financials are one group with roughly similar behavior, and notably underperforming all the other indi-
ces.  The U.S. and Developed Markets non-financial sector behave very similarly over the entire period, 
and although outperformed by the both Emerging Markets sectors in the first 18 months, both the 
Emerging Markets sectors collapse on to the other non-financial sector series by the crisis period, and 
the four series move similarly thereafter.  That the Emerging Markets financial sector performs more in 
line with the non-financial sectors is likely explained by the fact that Emerging Markets financial firms 
have lower exposures to mortgage securities than the Developed Market banks and were affected more 
like the non-financials, mostly by the credit squeeze and the resulting expected economic slowdown.  
This figure serves to highlight that the developed country financial sectors were the center of the mar-
ket’s fears and were the most negatively affected. 
Of the two developed financial sectors, the U.S. financial sector is the worst performer in two 
ways.  First it loses the most value over the sample period, dropping 71.1%, and it has far and away the 
most volatility of any of the other series, especially during the crisis period and the first two months of 
2009.  This latter point is despite the fact that the U.S. series has the advantage that its volatility is not 
influenced by exchange rate fluctuations.  Volatility for the other two financial sectors is generally quite 
comparable and only one-half to two-thirds of the high levels of volatility for the U.S. financials.  In 
contrast, on the non-financial side, all three regions have similar volatilities across periods and at levels 
that are generally slightly less than the volatility of the Developed Market ex North America and Emerg-
ing Markets financial sectors. 
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4 Country Market Analysis 
The Developed World ex North America and the Emerging Markets combine a large number of coun-
tries from different parts of the world into their portfolios.  In this section we examine these regions 
more closely by looking at some of the major countries (or groups of countries) within them to see how 
similar the impact of the financial crisis on equity values has been on a more localized level.  To facilitate 
the analysis in a manner consistent with the broad regional grouping above, we use gross return data 
from MSCI Barra for this section. 
Figure 7 displays the return index for the major subsets of the developed world.  Panel A shows 
the gross return index of the MSCI market in USDs for the United Kingdom, Europe ex UK, Japan, 
Pacific ex Japan and the United States.  Panel B shows the gross return index measured in local currency 
for the same constituents.  In both plots there is a noticeable deviation in performance following the 
August 2007 credit scare, with Japan performing much more poorly and the rest of the Pacific perform-
ing more strongly than the U.S. and European markets.  In local currency it appears as though the return 
indices start sloping down as of the second half of 2007, due to the depreciating USD over this period, 
while the indices in USD terms remain somewhat flatter.  While performance varies prior to the peak 
crisis period, all of the indices fall sharply during this 32-day period, and in USD terms end the sample 
period quite close together. 
The statistics for the corresponding series are shown in Tables 6a and 6b.  As evidenced in Table 
6a, in USD terms all of the indices are down between 43% and 52% for the sample period and report 
similar levels of USD return volatility.  In all cases, the drop during the 32 peak days of the crisis ac-
counts for the vast majority of the declines in 2008.  Volatilities in this period are also approximately 
four times higher than the values in 2007.  All of the indices are down double digits in the first two 
months of 2009, though volatility is only twice the average 2007 level. 
In local currency terms, we see from Table 6b that Japan’s market performance is less attractive 
than in USD terms, with the Japanese market down the most of all the indices in local currency over the 
entire sample period.  Except for the first two months of 2009, Japan also has higher performance vola-
tility in local currency than USD terms, suggesting that the JPY/USD exchange rate movements are 
negatively correlated with the yen returns.  On the other hand the UK market performance moves from 
worst to best when seen in local currency terms.  It is down the least of the 5 indices over the entire pe-
riod and fell much less in 2008 than the other markets.  The difference of course is because of the sig-
nificant pound depreciation against the USD in the last 6 months of 2008. 
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A breakdown of the Emerging Market index is displayed in Figure 8, with Panel A in USD terms 
and Panel B in local currency terms.  Rather than look at individual countries for the Emerging Markets, 
we look at the major Emerging Markets regional indices and the BRIC index.  Statistics for the regional 
Emerging Market indices are shown in Table 7a (USD terms) and 7b (local currency terms).  Looking at 
the two plots in Figure 8, while there is some dispersion amongst the regional Emerging Market indices, 
they all outperform the U.S. market in 2007 and early 2008.  There is more dispersion in the USD return 
chart, as the USD was depreciating against most Emerging Market region currencies in 2007 but appre-
ciated strongly against most of them in 2008.  But regardless of the currency of the return, all of the 
Emerging Market indices come crashing down to the same relative value level as the USD index (end of 
2006 = 100) once the peak crisis period hits.  By the end of the sample, Latin America fares better than 
EMEA in USD terms, largely due to the terrible performance of Russia relative to Brazil and the sharper 
drop in the Russian ruble.  In local currency terms, all of the indices except EMEA are down less than 
40% on their end of 2006 levels.  So while the fall from the peak is larger for all of the Emerging Market 
regions, and the fall during the crisis was larger than for U.S. equity, a long-term USD investor is no 
worse off due to the crisis over the past 26 months for holding Emerging Market equity than U.S. eq-
uity. 
5 Industry Performance 
Although we say earlier that the financial sectors in most markets fell further than the non-financial sec-
tors, in this section we take a closer look at the performance of more disaggregated industry portfolios 
for a variety of major countries and regions.  Despite the large number of statistics, due to the potential 
interest, we present detailed statistics and plots for the ten level-3 industry classification defined by 
DataStream for six different market groupings.  First we present and focus our discussion on perform-
ance of industries of the United States, the Developed Markets ex North America, and the Emerging 
Markets. 
The graphs are shown in Figure 9.  With 10 lines, the figures can be rather difficult to read 
clearly, but they are useful for getting a general impression of what happened before looking at the de-
tailed statistics displayed in Table 8 Panels a–f.  Starting with the United States, it is apparent that the 
financial industry has suffered the most from this crisis.  It has declined in value by at least 20% more 
than any of the other U.S. industries, falling a staggering 71% since the end of 2006.  In the United 
States, as in almost all of the other regions/countries the Oil & Gas and Basic Material industries signifi-
cantly outperformed all others through the middle of 2008 (up over 35% in 2007), but Basic Materials 
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fell sharply and ended 2008 mixed in with most of the other industries being down about 35%, while Oil 
& Gas held up the best losing only 25.5% on its end of 2006 value by the end of February 2009.  Most 
of the industries were basically flat prior to the crisis period, though Finance and especially Oil & Gas 
and Basic Materials were in noticeable decline for several months before the crisis period. In the United 
States, the crisis period hits all industries rather comparably.  Healthcare is down the least in the heat of 
the crisis, losing only 23.5%, while Basic Materials lost 49.5% in these 32 trading days. Industrials, along 
with Financials, have taken the biggest hit since the turn of 2009, with industrials (including GE) giving 
up 25% and financials another 33% in the first two months of the year.  For U.S. financials, the first two 
months of 2009 are nearly as bad as the peak crisis period.  The largest daily returns for each industry 
tend to be in the 10% range for positive returns and 8-9% for the worst down day.  The dates of these 
extremes are not surprisingly bunched during the crisis period; however, the financials worst down day 
is a 15% loss on December 1, 2008. 
The pattern for the other Developed Markets, displayed in Panel B of Figure 9 and Table 8b, is 
somewhat similar to the United States.  Finance is the worst performing industry, though relatively less 
so than in the United States.  Oil & Gas and Basic Materials are top performers until July 2008 when 
they both fall significantly.  At the end of the period, the industries are somewhat more fanned out than 
in the United States, with Telecom, Utilities and Healthcare near the top, and Finance, Technology and 
Basic Materials near the bottom.  Telecom suffers the least, losing only 21.4% with much of this loss 
occurring in 2009.  The crisis period was the hardest on Basic Material and Industrials each losing over 
40%, while Healthcare was least affected losing only 21% in that period.  Financials suffer the worst 
since the turn of the year, giving up another 25% of their value in USD terms. 
The Emerging Market industrial picture is notably different. First of all the financial industry is 
not the biggest loser.  In fact, it sits comfortably in the middle of the pack for almost the entire sample 
period.  This again highlights our earlier point that so far this is a financial crisis of the developed market 
players.  While Emerging Market financial firms are affected by this crisis, they are not at the center of it, 
as are the Developed Market financial firms.  The Emerging Market financial firms are no more affected 
than non-financial firms in the Emerging Markets.  However, it is ominous that the Emerging Market 
financials are down nearly the most of any of the industries so far in 2009, losing 17%, second only to 
Consumer Services that is down 18%. Technology firms turn out to be the biggest underperformers in 
the Emerging Markets, down over 52.3% for the entire period.  Healthcare is the best performing indus-
try in the Emerging Markets, suffering only a 15.5% loss over the entire period, and a minimal 4.0% in 
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2009.  Basic Materials stands out on the plot for the Emerging Markets as the best performer over most 
of the sample.  By May 2008, it is up over 12.0% on the end of 2006 levels, but proceeds to do a nose 
dive into the crisis, dropping over 62% in 2008, including 54.3% during the crisis, to end down almost 
32% over the period. 
6 Financial Sector Performance 
Since the financial sector is at the core of this market crisis, in this section we take a closer look at the 
financial industry and its major sub-industries, i.e. banks, insurance, real estate and financial services.  
Again we will consider these indices by the three region breakdown of the world, the United States, the 
Developed Markets ex North America, and the Emerging Markets. 
In the United States, Figure 10a shows the total return index performance of the U.S. financial 
industry and the above-mentioned 4 sub-industries.  Summary statistics for these series are displayed in 
Table 9a.  The figure clearly shows that all four sub-industries followed the same pattern as the aggre-
gate financials industry.  For much of the period, Banks (comprised of the U.S. commercial banks) un-
derperformed the other sub-industries.  However, just prior to the peak crisis the Financial Services sub-
industry, consisting largely of the investment banking firms, became the low performer and remained at 
the bottom until 2009 when the problems amongst the large commercial banks dropped the Bank sub-
industry back to the bottom.  For the entire period, all the financial sub-industries fell significantly in 
value.  Insurance, the best performer of the group, was down 61.6% for the period, while Banks, the 
worst performer, fell 77.4%. Banks also exhibit the highest volatility of the group, with annualized vola-
tility in excess of 100% since the crisis period, including the first two months of 2009.  It is also notable 
that the best and worst return days for most of these sub-industries fall outside of the main crisis period.  
For three of the four series, November 24, 2008 is the largest single return day and December 1, 2008 is 
the single largest drop in value of any day in the sample.  As evidence that the financial crisis is not over 
yet, three of the four groups have lost 29% of their value in the first two months of 2009, including a 
46.5% decline for the U.S. banks portfolio. 
For the Developed Markets excluding North America, Figure 10b shows that the 4 sub-
industries in the financial industry all tightly follow the aggregate industry performance.  As with the 
United States, the Insurance group slightly outperforms the others falling only 58.5% for the period, and 
the Bank group is the worst performer, falling 68.5%.  The crisis period was harder on these portfolios 
than it was on the U.S. equivalents.  Only the Real Estate group for the Developed Markets did not fall 
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more than its U.S. counterpart during the crisis.  In the first two months of 2009, only the Financial Ser-
vices portfolio for the Developed Market ex North America has declined more than its U.S. counterpart. 
Table 9b shows all the summary statistics for the Developed Markets ex North America financials and 
its 4 subgroups. 
As we saw earlier, the financial sector was not as badly affected in the Emerging Markets.  Figure 
10c shows that performance along with the performance of the same 4 sub-industries.  It is apparent 
that the Banks sub-industry constitutes most of the weight in the aggregate industry for the Emerging 
markets as the two series are virtually on top of one another.  In the middle of the sample period, the 
Real Estate groups moves significantly above the others, but it, along with the Financial Services portfo-
lio, experiences a sharp drop in mid January 2008 in the market turmoil surrounding the announcement 
of the first U.S. stimulus package, the two FED cuts in 8 days and the bankruptcy of Northern Rock in 
the United Kingdom.  Real Estate in the Emerging Markets proceeds to drop sharply for the next year, 
ending the sample period down 63.5%, the most of any of the Emerging Markets finance sub-industries.  
As with the other two regions, Insurance holds up the best throughout the crisis.  It ends the sample 
down only 31.3% (in USD terms), despite a 43.7% decline during the peak period of the crisis, due to a 
nice recovery in the last two months of 2008.  Nonetheless, all four groups are down between 12% and 
23% in the first two months of 2009. 
7 Style Portfolio Performance 
Another interesting question regarding equity market performance during the financial crisis is whether 
the crisis had differential impacts on any of the popular style portfolios commonly used in investing.  
We have taken a first step toward this by analyzing the two most basic style factors, growth versus value 
and size in the U.S. and EAFE market using MSCI style portfolios.  We obtain the MSCI large and small 
core portfolios and also the standard growth and standard value portfolios for the U.S. and EAFE 
groupings.  The plots of these are shown in Figure 11.  Panel A shows the U.S. style portfolios perform-
ance (in USD), and Panel B shows the EAFE style portfolio performance (in local currency).  While the 
series are very close together for the first 7 months, there is some separation from late July to October 
2007, and that degree of separation basically continues through the crisis period and to the end of the 
sample period.  In both plots, the growth portfolio outperforms, and the small portfolio underperforms.  
By the end of the sample period the difference between these two series is about 10 index points in both 
markets. 
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8 Volatility 
As we saw in Figure 1b, the volatility of the global equity market had a striking pattern over the sample 
period.  A few small bumps of increased volatility in the first 20 months of the sample are completely 
overwhelmed by the massive increase in volatility that began in September 2008.  In this section we will 
look at a rolling volatility measure and some implied volatility indices derived from exchange traded op-
tions to examine how volatility behaved across our three major market regions. 
Figure 12 displays the plots of annualized 30-day rolling volatility of the total return index (USD) 
for the U.S. portfolio and the Developed Markets ex North American portfolio, and the Emerging Mar-
ket portfolio.  It is shocking that all three plots are virtually identical, and virtually the same as the plot 
for the global market.  Volatility in all three markets is highly correlated over our sample period and very 
similar in absolute level.  While the Emerging Markets volatility rises more than the Developed Markets 
in the first couple of turmoil periods, the increase around the peak crisis period is nearly identical, with 
all three measures rising to 75-85% on an annualized basis. 
In Figure 13 we plot a series of implied volatility measures for the U.S. market and some of the 
major European markets.  These implied volatility measures are forecasts of expected volatility over the 
next 30 days, on an annualized basis taken from prices of options on the market indices.  First of all, 
once again, the series for the U.S. S&P 500, the UK FTSE 100, the German DAX, the French CAC 40, 
and the Dutch AEX, are all virtually on top of one another.  Comparing the patterns of the implied 
volatilities with the moving average volatilities in Figure 12, we see that the two are also very similar.  It 
appears that rather than anticipating the volatilities in the future, the implied volatilities largely reacted to 
changes in actual volatility measured in the market.  It is the case that near the end of the sample the 
implied volatilities were noticeably overestimating actual historical volatility, perhaps building in the 
probability that the crisis would not abate.  Unfortunately, the implied volatilities at the end of the sam-
ple (February 2009) were still predicting market volatility over the next 30 days at levels twice the pre-
crisis average. 
9 Correlations 
The last issue we will look at is the structure of correlation amongst returns over the sample period.  
There are many ways we could do this and we have taken three different approaches.  The first is to 
look at the changes in average cross-country correlations at the market index level for the Developed 
Markets and the Emerging Markets in the pre- and post-crisis period.  Another approach is to look at 
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correlation across industries within countries/regions and the correlation within industries across re-
gions.  Finally, since we are dealing with daily data and the synchronicity of daily returns is in question as 
events move around the globe, we look at the temporal structure of daily correlation pre- and post-crisis 
to see if there has been any change in the transmission of price shocks across markets from the Pacific 
region to the European region to the U.S. region. 
First let us look at simple cross-country/regional correlations.  These correlations are done on a 
daily basis using calendar days so it is possible that there may be some degree of misalignment in meas-
uring correlation effects.  Nonetheless we take daily returns from MSCI for the United States, United 
Kingdom, Europe ex UK, Japan and Pacific ex Japan as well as the three Emerging market regions, EM-
Asia, EM Latin America and EM EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa).  We measured the average 
daily correlation amongst the gross returns to these portfolios (in USD terms).  It is apparent that there 
is a non-trivial increase in correlation in the crisis period (9/12/08 - 10/27/08), but a much less signifi-
cant increase in correlation for the post crisis period (10/28/08 – 2/27/09).  In the crisis period itself, 
the Developed Markets see an increase in correlation of 41%, more than the 36% increase amongst the 
Emerging Markets and the 35% increase for the cross-market correlations.  This is again some evidence 
that this crisis itself was really a problem in Developed Markets, and that it is more sensitive to linkages 
across Developed Markets than Emerging Markets.  However, in the post-crisis period, the correlations 
amongst the Developed Markets drop back much closer to their pre-crisis levels than correlations 
amongst the Emerging Market or even the cross-market correlations. 
With regard to industry correlation, there is a general increase in the correlation across industries 
within a regional market (not reported).  While the correlation increases, it does so from a high average 
level to begin with, and is largest during the peak crisis period and then returns to something close the 
its pre-crisis level in the latter part of the sample.  What we do show is the data on the impact on the 
average correlation within an industry across regions.  Table 11, displays these results. For every industry 
there is an increase in the average correlation amongst its daily returns across the United States, Devel-
oped Markets ex North America, and Emerging Markets regions.  The equal weighted average across 
industries is an increase from 0.440 to 0.596, or about a 32% rise.  The average correlation drops back in 
the post-crisis period but is still higher than in the pre-crisis period.  This may be evidence that the crisis 
is still continuing, albeit at a somewhat milder fashion than in September and October.  For some indus-
tries such as utilities the increase in average correlation is very large (although on a small starting value), 
while for others such as Basic Materials it is hardly noticeable and not economically meaningful. 
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Finally, in an attempt to better understand the transmission of price relevant information during 
the crisis, Table 12 displays the pattern of leading and lagged correlations across the three major regions 
of the world: Pacific (PAC), Europe (EUR) and the United States (USA).  The idea is to see if there is 
any meaningful change in the pattern of price shock transmission across markets.  It is also a way to de-
termine if there is a market in which key price-relevant information is first made public.  The top part of 
Table 12 shows the temporal pattern of correlation between the pairs of markets in the pre-crisis period.  
So, for example, the price change in the United States on day t is correlated with the price change in the 
Pacific market on day t+1 at a level of 0.591, while the this same day t Pacific price change is only corre-
lated with the day t U.S. market price change at a level of 0.073. 
Looking at the correlation in the pre-crisis period compared the crisis period, several things 
jump out.  There is a noticeable increase in temporal transmission of price shocks.  A price shock in the 
United States on day t is much more correlated with the price reaction in the Pacific on day t+1 and 
even Europe on day t+1 that pre crisis.  Moreover, a shock to the Pacific market in day t has a much 
stronger effect on the European markets in day t than in the pre-crisis period.  Also, the transmission 
from Europe to the United States on day t has also grown much stronger, rising from a correlation of 
0.484 to 0.646.  It remains that shocks to the Pacific markets do not have much of an impact on the U.S. 
market in the same day.  Thus, it appears that Europe and the United States have been the primary loca-
tions for disclosure of important price information into the markets during the crisis.  This is a final 
piece of evidence suggesting that this crisis is largely the making of the world’s Anglo-American banking 
sector. 
10 Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
A global equity market collapse of this magnitude raises a number of critical questions about financial 
markets.  Much of the attention will be on the banking sector and its regulation, and the antecedents 
that lead to the crisis.  However, even just with respect to the behavior of equity markets, there are is-
sues at both the macro level and micro level to be considered.  Some are new questions to consider, and 
others are existing ones that will need to be revisited.  At the macro level, the global nature of this crisis 
allows researchers the opportunity to better understand the nature of the transmission of information 
shocks across global markets; the extent to which markets are behaving in an integrated or segmented 
fashion, and to the extent that there are differences in equity performance across countries, determining 
the economic sources of these differences (or lack thereof).  Also because leverage in the system at the 
beginning of the crisis was so high, there is the interesting question of whether or how the coordinated 
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(global) de-leveraging activities, which started in August 2007 and continued through the period, have 
affected market behavior.  At the micro level there are questions relating to the performance of specific 
trading strategies such as market neutral styles and the extent to which they offer some sort of protec-
tion or diversification to investors.  Also, what influence if any did some of the policy choices have on 
market behavior, such as tying mark-to-market accounting to regulatory capital and temporary restric-
tions on short selling imposed in several countries.  Undoubtedly, even equity market researchers will be 
busy examining this event for many years. 
Ultimately, there will be the impact that this financial crisis has on the strategy of global invest-
ing.  The crisis drove down equity levels across the globe, and in nearly every country, sector and indus-
try.  Perhaps the biggest issue to arise out of this crisis will be how does one invest intelligently in a mar-
ket were such events occur.  It seems likely that many investors are questioning previously held views 
about the risk of equity and the benefits of global diversification.  For many, diversification may need to 
be more broadly defined.  Research and speculation on investment strategies for investors in the post-
crisis world going forward will also be an important new area. 
To look forward, one needs to have a clear idea of what has happened in the past.  This paper 
provides a detailed factual backdrop on how equity markets have behaved during this most recent crisis, 
considering the performance of the global equity market over the past few years, in aggregate as well as 
by country and industry.  In addition to performance, we investigate volatilities and correlations, and 
link significant economic or policy events from the crisis to the market reactions.  In summary, the eq-
uity market reaction is basically second order to the mortgage and banking crises until July/August 2008, 
and the real equity market action (collapse) starts in the middle of September 2008 with the bankruptcy 
of Lehman and the bailout of AIG.  Equity markets around the world universally took a deep dive in the 
period from September 15 through late October.  For most indices, these 32 trading days contain the 
majority of the decline for the year.  By the end of 2008, with few exceptions, most equity indices were 
at 60% or less of their end of 2006 levels, and down 50% from their highs.  Unfortunately, despite all of 
the financial advice about diversification, in this crisis equity investors had no place to hide. 
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Figure 1a: World Market Portfolio Total Return Index (USD) 
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Figure 1b: World Market Volatility 
30 day moving average annualized standard deviation of the total return index on DS World Market 
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Figure 2: Total Return Index (USD) for Major Component Markets: U.S., Developed Markets ex North 
America, and Merging Markets 
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Figure 3a: Major U.S. Market Declines since 1926 
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Figure 3b: World Market Portfolio and World Value – Growth Portfolio 
‐40
‐20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
‐20
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
15
20
D
ec
 2
9,
 2
00
6
Ja
n 
29
, 2
00
7
M
ar
 0
1,
 2
00
7
A
pr
 0
1,
 2
00
7
M
ay
 0
1,
 2
00
7
Ju
n 
01
, 2
00
7
Ju
l 0
1,
 2
00
7
A
ug
 0
1,
 2
00
7
Se
p 
01
, 2
00
7
O
ct
 0
1,
 2
00
7
N
ov
 0
1,
 2
00
7
D
ec
 0
1,
 2
00
7
Ja
n 
01
, 2
00
8
Fe
b 
01
, 2
00
8
M
ar
 0
1,
 2
00
8
A
pr
 0
1,
 2
00
8
M
ay
 0
1,
 2
00
8
Ju
n 
01
, 2
00
8
Ju
l 0
1,
 2
00
8
A
ug
 0
1,
 2
00
8
Se
p 
01
, 2
00
8
O
ct
 0
1,
 2
00
8
N
ov
 0
1,
 2
00
8
D
ec
 0
1,
 2
00
8
Ja
n 
01
, 2
00
9
Fe
b 
01
, 2
00
9
R
eturn Index
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 G
ain
/L
os
s o
n 
V
alu
e-
G
ro
w
th
 P
or
tfo
lio
Percentage Gain/Loss on Portfolio 
long World Value portfolio and short 
World Growth portfolio (LHS scale) 
Return index of Total World 
Market Portfolio (RHS scale)
 22
Figure 4: Financial and Non-Financial Sectors for World Market (USD) 
Panel A: 12/29/06 – 2/29/09 
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Panel B: 8/29/08 – 2/20/09 
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Figure 5: Financial and Non-Financial Sectors by Major Component Markets 
Panel A: U.S. Financial and Non-Financial Sectors (USD) 
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Panel B: Developed Markets ex-NA Financial and Non-financial Sectors (USD) 
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Panel C: Emerging Markets Financial and Non-financial Sectors (USD) 
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Figure 6: Financial and Non-Financial Sectors for U.S., Developed Markets ex NA, and 
 Emerging Market Regions 
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Figure 7: Total Return Index for Developed Country Markets 
Panel A: USD Returns 
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Panel B: Local Currency Returns 
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Figure 8: Total Return Index for Emerging Market Regions and USA 
Panel A: USD Returns 
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Panel B: Local Currency Returns 
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Figure 9: Total Return Index for Industry Portfolios by Country/Region 
Panel A: U.S. Market Industries 
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Panel B: Developed Markets Ex North America Industries 
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Figure 9: Total Return Index for Industry Portfolios by Country/Region (con’t) 
Panel C: Emerging Market Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 10: Total Return Index for Financial Industry and Components Country/Region 
Panel A: U.S. Financials and Components 
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Panel B: Developed Markets Ex North America Financials and Components 
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Figure 10: Total Return Index for Financial Industry and Components Country/Region (con’t) 
Panel C: Emerging Markets Financials and Components 
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Figure 11: Performance of Style Portfolios 
Panel A: MSCI USA - Standard Core, Standard Growth, Standard Value Small Core 
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Panel B: MSCI EAFE - Standard Core, Standard Growth, Standard Value Small Core 
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
De
c 2
9,
 2
00
6
Ja
n 
29
, 2
00
7
M
ar
 0
1,
 2
00
7
Ap
r 0
1,
 2
00
7
M
ay
 0
1,
 2
00
7
Ju
n 
01
, 2
00
7
Ju
l 0
1,
 2
00
7
Au
g 0
1,
 2
00
7
Se
p 
01
, 2
00
7
O
ct
 0
1,
 2
00
7
No
v 
01
, 2
00
7
De
c 0
1,
 2
00
7
Ja
n 
01
, 2
00
8
Fe
b 
01
, 2
00
8
M
ar
 0
1,
 2
00
8
Ap
r 0
1,
 2
00
8
M
ay
 0
1,
 2
00
8
Ju
n 
01
, 2
00
8
Ju
l 0
1,
 2
00
8
Au
g 0
1,
 2
00
8
Se
p 
01
, 2
00
8
O
ct
 0
1,
 2
00
8
No
v 
01
, 2
00
8
De
c 0
1,
 2
00
8
Ja
n 
01
, 2
00
9
Fe
b 
01
, 2
00
9
in
de
x
EAFE Large Core
EAFE Standard Growth
EAFE Standard Value
EAFE Small Core
 
 32
Figure 12: Market Volatility 
Moving Average 30-Day Market Return Standard Deviation 
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Figure 13: Implied Market Volatility 
United States and various European Markets 
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Table 1: DataStream Total World Market Portfolio statistics (USD) 
 
 
USD Return Index WORLD Market 
Full Sample Return 1/1/07-2/27/09 -45.4% 
Stdev (annualized) 24.2% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 15.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 13.0% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -43.3% 
Stdev (annualized) 31.2% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/09 -36.8% 
Stdev (annualized)  58.0% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09  -16.5% 
Stdev (annualized)  25.7% 
Max daily return  8.5% 
Date 10/13/08 
Min daily return  -6.4% 
Date 10/15/08 
Period Wealth Loss (USD millions) 
From Peak to 2/27/09 -$29,148,950 
9/15/08-10/27/08 -$14,013,020 
1/1/09 -2/27/09 -$4,481,320 
 
Table Notes: Data taken from Thompson’s DataStream service; series TOTMKWD, using 
total return index (RI).  Data in USD.  
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Table 2: Total Return Index Statistics for DataStream U.S., Developed Markets excluding North 
 America, and Emerging Market Total Market Indices (USD) 
USD Return Index US Market 
DEV.MKTS.EX-
NA Market 
EMERGING 
MARKETS  
Market 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06- 2/27/09 -44.3% -47.5% -41.8% 
Stdev (annualized) 31.1% 26.0% 29.1% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 7.1% 12.3% 43.6% 
Stdev (annualized) 15.6% 14.4% 18.7% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -37.2% -43.1% -54.4% 
Stdev (annualized) 40.4% 33.5% 36.6% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -32.7% -36.4% -45.9% 
Stdev (annualized)  72.5% 61.2% 69.0% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -17.2% -17.9% -11.2% 
Stdev (annualized)  36.1% 27.5% 28.2% 
Max daily return 11.5% 7.5% 9.4% 
Date 10/13/08 10/13/08 09/19/08 
Min daily return  -9.0% -7.8% -9.4% 
Date 10/15/08 10/10/08 10/06/08 
Period  Wealth Loss (USD millions)  
From Peak to 2/27/09 -$9,209,840 -$13,940,470 -$5,146,304 
9/15/08-10/27/08 -$4,446,839 -$6,263,370 -$2,660,009 
1/1/09-2/27/09 -$1,659,703 -$2,294,590 -$425,726 
 
 
Table Notes: Data taken from Thompson’s DataStream service; series TOTMKUS, for the US Market, TOTMKEF 
for the market of the developed world excluding North America, (equivalent to MSCI’s EAFE) and TOTMKEK 
for the emerging market.  Series are the total return index (RI) and measured in USD. 
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Table 3: Statistics for all Declines in S&P 500 Index of over 20% since 1926 (monthly data) 
 
 Return to 
Trough 
Months: Peak 
to Trough  
Months: Peak 
back to Peak  Date of Peak  
 September 2007  -54.1% 17* ??? 
 August 1929 -83.4% 34 184 
 February 1937 -50.0% 13 85 
 September 1939 -30.3% 31 45 
 May 1946 -21.8% 11 41 
 December 1961 -22.3% 6 16 
 November 1968 -29.2% 19 28 
 December 1972 -42.6% 21 42 
 August 1987 -29.5% 3 21 
 August 2000 -30.5% 13 77 
  
Table Notes: Data are for the US S&P 500 index from the Ibbotson database.  Dates are 
the end of month with the highest index value before a decline in the index of 20%.  Peak 
to Trough is the time (in months) for the market to reach its bottom, and Peak to Peak is 
the time for the index to reach the previous peak level again (this period may include 
subsequent declines of more than 20%).  
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Table 4: Total Return Index Statistics for DataStream World Non-Financial Sector and World Financial 
Sector Indices (USD) 
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USD Return Index 
 
WORLD  
Non-Financials  
WORLD 
Financials 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -38.3% -63.9% 
Stdev (annualized) 23.0% 30.4% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 20.8% 0.3% 
Stdev (annualzied) 12.5% 15.4% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -40.6% -51.7% 
Stdev (annualized) 29.8% 38.8% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -35.7% -40.5% 
Stdev (annualized)  55.3% 71.1% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -14.0% -25.6% 
Stdev (annualized)  23.4% 38.7% 
Max daily return 8.7% 11.0% 
Date 10/13/08 09/19/08 
M  -7.9% in daily return  -6.6%
D 8 09/29/08 ate 10/15/0
 
Table Notes: Data are for the Non-Financial and Financial sectors of the World Market 
Portfolio as defined by DataStream.  Series used are TOTLIWD for the non-financial sector of 
and FINANWD for the financial sector.  All data are total return indices and in USD. 
 
Table 5: Non- Financial and Financial Total Return Index Statistics 
DataStream Non-financial and Financial Sectors of the United States, Developed World ex North America, 
and Emerging Markets (USD) 
 
  NON FINANCIALS FINANCIALS 
 USD Return Index US 
DEV MKTS 
ex_ NA 
EMERGING 
MARKETS US 
DEV 
MKTS 
ex_ NA 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06- 2/27/09 -35.9% -39.78% -46.55% -71.1% -64.95% -40.11% 
Stdev (annualized) 28.8% 24.76% 33.03% 49.9% 32.14% 28.25% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 13.6% 18.18% 36.42% -14.2% -1.15% 46.24% 
Stdev (annualized) 14.7% 13.89% 21.51% 21.4% 16.63% 17.97% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -34.3% -39.53% -52.77% -49.6% -52.68% -54.94% 
Stdev (annualized) 37.5% 31.95% 41.30% 63.0% 41.10% 35.53% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -32.3% -34.46% -47.72% -34.2% -41.74% -45.34% 
Stdev (annualized)  69.1% 57.67% 76.35% 103.8% 75.54% 67.01% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -14.1% -15.73% -17.04% -33.3% -25.07% -9.12% 
Stdev (annualized)  31.5% 25.14% 32.59% 76.6% 39.62% 27.03% 
Max daily return 12.0% 7.51% 11.13% 14.4% 11.61% 8.81% 
date 10/13/08 10/13/08 09/19/08 11/24/08 09/19/08 09/19/08 
Min daily return  -9.0% -7.29% -8.72% -15.0% -9.31% -9.58% 
Date 10/15/08 10/10/08 10/06/08 12/01/08 10/10/08 10/06/08 
 
 
Table Notes: Data are for the Non-Financial and Financial sector portfolios as defined by DataStream for the US, Developed Markets 
excluding North America and the Emerging Markets.  Series used are TOTLIUS, TOTLIEF and TOTLIEK for the non-financial sectors 
of the three regions and FINANUS, FINANEF and FINANEK for the financial sectors.  All data are total return indices and in USD. 
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Table 6a: Developed Market Gross Return Statistics (USD) 
MCSIBarra UK, Europe ex UK, Japan, Pacific ex-Japan and USA Core Market Portfolios 
Gross Return Index (USD) 
UNITED 
KINGDOM  
EUROPE ex 
UK  JAPAN  
PACIFIC ex 
JAPAN  USA  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -51.8% -50.1% -44.5% -43.2% -45.1%
Stdev (annualized) 35.5% 32.8% 31.2% 36.0% 31.5% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 8.4% 17.5% -4.1% 31.7% 6.0%
Stdev (annualzied) 19.2% 17.0% 18.2% 23.1% 15.9%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -48.3% -45.0% -29.1% -50.0% -37.1%
Stdev (annualized) 45.7% 42.2% 39.6% 45.6% 40.9%
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -38.3% -38.7% -27.6% -41.3% -32.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  83.1% 72.2% 66.8% 84.3% 73.7%
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -13.9% -22.7% -18.3% -13.7% -17.6%
Stdev (annualized)  40.8% 38.9% 34.5% 32.6% 36.5% 
Max daily return 13.0% 11.1% 12.2% 8.7% 11.7%
Date 10/29/08 11/24/08 10/14/08 10/13/08 10/13/08
Min daily return  -9.9% -9.6% -9.1% -12.3% -9.1% 
Date 10/10/08 10/06/08 10/16/08 10/10/08 10/15/08
  
 
Table 6b: Developed Market Gross Return Statistics (Local Currency) 
MCSIBarra UK, Europe ex UK, Japan, Pacific ex-Japan and USA Core Market Portfolios 
Gross Return Index    (Local Currency ) UNITED KINGDOM EUROPE ex UK  JAPAN  PACIFIC ex JAPAN USA  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -33.8% -48.3% -54.4% -34.6% -45.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 29.1% 28.1% 33.4% 26.4% 31.5% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 6.6% 6.6% -10.1% 21.6% 6.0% 
Stdev (annualized) 17.3% 15.4% 19.5% 17.6% 15.9% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -28.5% -42.7% -42.5% -41.6% -37.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 37.4% 36.5% 43.2% 33.4% 40.9% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -28.8% -31.2% -37.0% -28.1% -32.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  69.6% 66.2% 77.6% 54.7% 73.7% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -13.1% -15.3% -11.9% -7.8% -17.6% 
Stdev (annualized)  28.1% 28.9% 31.4% 21.7% 36.5% 
Max daily return 9.7% 10.4% 14.0% 6.5% 11.7%
Date 11/14/08 10/13/08 10/14/08 10/13/08 10/13/08
Min daily return  -8.8% -7.6% -9.9% -8.0% -9.1%
Date 10/10/08 10/06/08 10/16/08 10/10/08 10/15/08 
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Table 7a: Emerging Markets Gross Return Statistics (USD) 
MCSIBarra BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Emerging Markets (EM) Asia , EM Europe Middle East & Africa 
(EMEA), EM Latin America (LAM) and USA Markets 
Gross Return in USD BRIC  EM ASIA  EM EMEA  EM LAM  USA  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -40.3% -41.4% -51.9% -30.6% -45.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 40.1% 34.1% 37.4% 47.0% 31.5% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 59.1% 41.6% 28.7% 50.7% 6.0% 
Stdev (annualized) 24.4% 23.1% 21.0% 29.4% 15.9%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -59.3% -52.8% -55.6% -51.3% -37.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 51.1% 42.0% 48.2% 59.4% 40.9% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -51.5% -42.6% -49.8% -52.5% -32.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  100.2% 66.6% 87.3% 115.7% 73.7% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -7.6% -12.3% -15.8% -5.4% -17.6% 
Stdev (annualized)  38.5% 33.9% 38.4% 47.5% 36.5%
Max daily return 14.5% 13.5% 13.7% 16.6% 11.7%
Date 09/19/08 10/30/08 09/19/08 10/13/08 10/13/08
Min daily return  -11.2% -8.3% -14.3% -14.0% -9.1%
Date 10/06/08 10/16/08 10/06/08 10/15/08 10/15/08 
  
 
Table 7b: Emerging Markets Gross Return Statistics (Local Currency) 
MCSIBarra BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Emerging Markets (EM) Asia , EM Europe Middle East & Africa 
(EMEA), EM Latin America (LAM) and USA Markets 
 Gross Return in Local Currency  BRIC  EM ASIA  EM EMEA  EM LAM  USA  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -35.8% -30.6% -42.6% -17.6% -45.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 35.4% 30.1% 30.2% 36.2% 31.5% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 48.0% 39.1% 21.8% 35.6% 6.0% 
Stdev (annualized) 21.7% 21.6% 16.9% 23.3% 15.9%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -53.9% -47.1% -48.6% -37.7% -37.1% 
Stdev (annualized) 45.2% 36.5% 39.2% 45.6% 40.9% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -46.8% -37.1% -40.9% -40.5% -32.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  87.7% 57.1% 73.6% 85.5% 73.7% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -5.9% -5.7% -8.4% -2.5% -17.6% 
Stdev (annualized)  32.9% 29.9% 28.6% 35.6% 36.5%
Max daily return 13.0% 9.3% 12.2% 12.8% 11.7% 
Date 09/19/08 10/30/08 09/19/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 
Min daily return  -9.7% -7.6% -11.8% -10.6% -9.1% 
Date 10/24/08 10/24/08 10/06/08 10/15/08 10/15/08
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Table 8a: U.S. Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Major (Level 3) Industry Portfolios for the U.S. Market 
Total return Index (USD) 
US
Oil & Gas 
US
Basic Mats 
US
Industrials 
US Cons
Goods 
US  
Hlth Care 
US Cons
Servs 
US Tele-
com 
US Utili-
ties 
US
Financials 
US 
Techn 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -25.5% -40.4% -48.3% -29.4% -26.6% -42.4% -35.7% -28.5% -71.1% -37.6%
Stdev (annualized) 43.8% 46.0% 31.3% 22.9% 23.4% 29.4% 33.5% 29.5% 49.8% 32.6%
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 34.1% 38.9% 14.3% 10.6% 7.0% -4.1% 10.4% 19.0% -14.2% 17.6% 
Stdev (annualized) 22.2% 23.1% 16.1% 12.2% 11.8% 15.0% 17.0% 17.4% 21.4% 18.2%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -35.9% -50.6% -39.7% -25.4% -21.6% -29.9% -33.1% -30.5% -49.6% -43.1%
Stdev (annualized) 57.8% 60.0% 40.1% 29.7% 30.6% 38.4% 44.1% 38.3% 63.0% 41.1% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -35.6% -49.4% -37.4% -27.1% -23.5% -35.2% -28.0% -27.6% -34.2% -31.4%
Stdev (annualized)  113.9% 101.0% 62.9% 53.4% 59.3% 61.4% 77.3% 75.6% 103.7% 70.7%
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -13.4% -13.0% -25.0% -14.4% -12.6% -14.3% -13.0% -13.5% -33.3% -6.7% 
Stdev (annualized)  43.4% 51.9% 38.6% 24.6% 26.0% 32.7% 35.0% 25.7% 76.6% 41.2%
Max daily return 18.9% 15.6% 9.7% 9.5% 12.1% 11.6% 14.2% 14.3% 14.4% 12.3%
Date 10/13/08 10/13/08 10/28/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 10/28/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 11/24/08 10/14/08 
Min daily return  -15.3% -13.4% -9.1% -7.2% -6.8% -9.0% -8.4% -8.3% -15.0% -9.4%
Date 10/15/08 10/15/08 10/15/08 10/9/08 10/9/08 10/15/08 10/15/08 10/15/08 12/1/08 9/29/08
 
 
Table 8b: Developed Markets ex NA Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Major (Level 3) Industry Portfolios for the Developed Markets ex North America Market  
Total Return Index (USD) 
Dev
Mkts  
xNA  
Oil & Gas 
Dev 
Mkts 
xNA  
Basic Mats 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA 
Industrials 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA  
Cons Gds 
Dev  
Mkts 
 xNA  
Hlth Care 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA 
ConsSvs 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA 
Telecom 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA  
Utilities 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA  
Finan 
Dev 
Mkts  
xNA 
Tech 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -33.1% -47.2% -49.3% -39.0% -31.9% -43.3% -21.4% -29.1% -64.9% -53.8%
Stdev (annualized) 37.9% 38.4% 28.6% 22.9% 20.4% 21.3% 24.9% 26.3% 32.1% 27.4% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 26.3% 32.4% 15.4% 16.4% 1.1% 6.6% 36.3% 30.8% -1.1% 0.8%
Stdev (annualized) 19.3% 21.5% 16.4% 12.3% 11.4% 12.9% 16.5% 12.8% 16.6% 14.9%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -40.5% -53.6% -46.5% -39.5% -17.9% -37.1% -32.2% -32.2% -52.7% -44.7% 
Stdev (annualized) 50.1% 49.6% 36.3% 29.2% 26.6% 27.0% 31.1% 35.2% 41.1% 34.9%
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -39.2% -50.7% -42.2% -29.5% -21.1% -29.9% -27.0% -28.7% -41.7% -37.2%
Stdev (annualized)  87.3% 85.2% 61.5% 44.1% 50.6% 47.4% 60.3% 67.5% 75.5% 58.1% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -10.9% -14.1% -17.9% -13.5% -18.0% -15.5% -15.1% -20.1% -25.1% -17.1%
Stdev (annualized)  37.2% 40.1% 31.9% 27.2% 18.4% 21.8% 23.8% 22.8% 39.6% 32.4%
Max daily return 14.3% 11.8% 8.40% 13.38% 7.19% 5.81% 8.68% 12.30% 11.61% 7.14% 
Date 10/29/08 10/29/08 10/29/08 10/28/08 10/13/08 10/29/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 9/19/08 10/29/08 
Min daily return  -10.5% -10.4% -8.05% -5.80% -7.86% -7.54% -8.62% -8.55% -9.31% -8.27% 
Date 10/6/08 10/6/08 10/16/08 10/22/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 11/6/08 
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Table 8c: Emerging Markets Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Major (Level 3) Industry Portfolios for the Emerging Markets 
Total Return Index (USD) 
EM  Oil & 
Gas  
EM  Basic 
Mats  
EM  
Industrials  
EM Cons 
Gds  
EM Health 
Care  
EM Cons 
Svs  
EM  
Telecom  
EM  
Utilities  
EM  
Financials  
EM  
Techn  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -46.2% -31.8% -46.7% -31.2% -15.9% -47.5% -28.4% -30.9% -46.5% -53.6%
Stdev (annualized) 37.6% 35.2% 31.6% 24.2% 19.0% 24.4% 23.8% 25.6% 33.0% 33.5% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 39.9% 95.4% 61.5% 53.2% 23.7% 19.6% 38.9% 42.7% 36.4% 1.6%
Stdev (annualzied) 20.0% 23.1% 22.0% 18.8% 15.1% 17.5% 17.2% 16.6% 21.5% 22.0%
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -59.2% -62.4% -61.4% -49.9% -29.2% -46.5% -41.0% -47.9% -52.8% -52.2% 
Stdev (annualized) 49.4% 43.5% 38.7% 28.7% 22.4% 29.7% 28.8% 32.3% 41.3% 41.3%
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -52.1% -54.3% -47.9% -37.3% -26.0% -40.2% -35.9% -37.8% -47.7% -38.6%
Stdev (annualized)  97.9% 74.7% 68.0% 54.0% 35.9% 55.3% 54.2% 63.2% 76.3% 61.4% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -5.6% -7.1% -14.4% -10.2% -4.0% -18.0% -12.6% -7.2% -17.0% -4.4%
Stdev (annualized)  35.3% 36.5% 29.6% 20.8% 16.5% 22.6% 22.6% 22.2% 32.6% 38.5%
Max daily return 16.2% 8.3% 9.8% 6.2% 4.1% 6.8% 6.9% 8.8% 11.1% 12.9% 
Date 9/19/08 9/19/08 10/30/08 10/20/08 10/14/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 10/13/08 09/19/08 10/30/08
Min daily return  -13.3% -11.9% -9.4% -7.1% -5.4% -8.7% -7.2% -8.0% -8.7% -8.4%
Date 10/6/08 10/6/08 10/16/08 10/8/08 10/24/08 10/6/08 10/22/08 10/6/08 10/6/08 10/16/08 
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Table 9a: U.S. Finance Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Financial Industry and Components for the U.S. Market 
Total return index USD 
US 
Financials  
US 
Banks   
US 
Insurance  
US Real 
Estate   
US Financial 
Svs  
Total Sample Return 12/31/06-2/27/09 -71.1% -77.4% -61.6% -66.1% -71.0%
Stdev (annualized) 49.8% 63.3% 37.5% 58.1% 54.7% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 -14.2% -23.5% 0.1% -15.8% -14.5% 
Stdev (annualized) 21.4% 23.6% 15.8% 25.8% 25.5% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -49.6% -44.6% -46.0% -40.3% -59.4% 
Stdev (annualized) 63.0% 77.5% 48.1% 74.9% 70.0% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -34.2% -25.5% -33.2% -46.5% -42.0% 
Stdev (annualized)  103.7% 128.5% 84.7% 104.5% 116.7% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -33.3% -46.8% -29.0% -32.6% -16.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  76.6% 114.3% 53.7% 79.4% 76.4% 
Max daily return 14.4% 19.4% 12.1% 18.6% 16.7%
Date 11/24/08 11/24/08 10/13/08 10/28/08 11/24/08 
Min daily return  -15.0% -17.6% -10.5% -18.3% -15.8%
Date 12/1/08 12/1/08 11/19/08 12/1/08 12/1/08 
 
Table 9b: Developed Markets ex NA Finance Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Financial Industry and Components for the Developed Markets ex North America Market 
Total return index USD 
Dev Mkts 
xNA 
Financials   
Dev Mkts 
xNA 
Banks    
Dev Mkts 
xNA 
Insurance   
Dev Mkts 
xNA Real 
Estate    
Dev Mkts 
xNA Financial 
Svs    
Total Sample Return 12/31/06- 2/27/09 -64.9% -68.5% -58.5% -61.6% -61.7% 
Stdev (annualized) 32.1% 34.8% 36.3% 28.7% 28.9% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 -1.1% -4.2% 1.9% -0.1% 3.9%
Stdev (annualized) 16.6% 17.1% 17.3% 19.5% 17.7% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -52.7% -55.9% -40.7% -52.5% -53.0% 
Stdev (annualized) 41.1% 44.3% 46.4% 35.5% 36.5%
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -41.7% -42.7% -43.1% -38.3% -39.5% 
Stdev (annualized)  75.5% 81.7% 82.7% 60.9% 64.9% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -25.1% -25.4% -31.4% -19.1% -21.4%
Stdev (annualized)  39.6% 46.6% 48.6% 28.4% 29.8% 
Max daily return 11.6% 13.9% 12.8% 7.1% 7.7% 
Date 9/19/08 10/29/08 10/29/08 10/29/08 09/19/08 
Min daily return  -9.3% -9.9% -9.5% -8.3% -7.9% 
Date 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/10/08 10/6/08 
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Table 9c: Emerging Markets Finance Industry Total Return Index Statistics (USD) 
DataStream Financial Industry and Components for the Emerging Markets 
Total return Index USD 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Financials 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Banks 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Insurance 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Real Estate 
EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Financial Svs 
Total Sample Return 12/31/06- 2/27/09 -46.5% -46.4% -31.3% -63.5% -45.3% 
Stdev (annualized) 33.0% 33.7% 40.7% 35.5% 32.4% 
2007 Return 12/31/06-12/31/07 36.4% 30.1% 53.1% 94.1% 55.3% 
Stdev (annualized) 21.5% 21.7% 28.7% 25.6% 21.7% 
2008 Return 12/31/07-12/31/08 -52.8% -50.2% -48.8% -75.5% -57.8% 
Stdev (annualized) 41.3% 42.3% 50.0% 43.0% 40.0% 
Crisis Period Return 9/12/08-10/27/08 -47.7% -47.2% -43.7% -56.5% -48.8% 
Stdev (annualized)  76.3% 79.8% 80.0% 64.4% 68.4% 
Partial 2009 Return 12/31/08-2/27/09 -17.0% -17.3% -12.4% -23.0% -16.4% 
Stdev (annualized)  32.6% 33.6% 38.3% 29.0% 32.1% 
Max daily return 11.1% 12.0% 11.1% 11.1% 8.5% 
Date 9/19/08 9/19/08 10/30/08 12/11/07 09/19/08 
Min daily return  -8.7% -8.9% -8.9% -12.3% -9.1% 
Date 10/6/08 10/6/08 10/6/08 10/24/0808 10/6/08 
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Table 10: Cross country/Regional Average Correlations 
MSCI data using U.S., UK, Europe ex UK, Japan and Pacific ex-Japan as Developed Market and the three EM regions, EM 
Asia, EM Latin America and EM EMEA as the Emerging Markets 
Developed Market Emerging Markets Cross-market 
% chg % chg % chg
Pre-Crisis Period 0.425 0.585 0.506
1/1/07 - 9/12/08
Crisis Period 0.597 41% 0.793 36% 0.685 35%
9/15/08 - 10/27/08
Post Crisis Period 0.437 2.9% 0.681 16.4% 0.569 12.4%
10/28/08 - 2/27/09  
Table notes: The numbers are the simple average of the correlations in each group or across 
each group.  Developed markets is an average amongst the 5 Developed Markets listed 
above for the period defined.  The Emerging Markets is the average correlation amongst the 
three EM regions listed above for the defined period. The cross market value is the average 
correlation between the 5 Developed Markets and the 3 EM markets listed above for the 
defined period.  The % chg is the % increase in correlation relative to the pre-crisis period.  
All correlations are done using daily change in the gross return index measured in USD. 
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Table 11: Within Industry correlations across U.S., Developed Markets ex NA, and Emerging Market Industry Portfolios 
Pre Crisis Crisis Period Post Crisis 
1/01/07 - 9/12/08 9/15/08 - 10/27/08 10/28/08 -2/29/09 Crisis Post Crisis 
 Oil & Gas 0.528 0.600 0.615 13.6% 16.4%
Basic Mats 0.608 0.647 0.673 6.5% 10.7%
 Industrials 0.428 0.561 0.556 31.1% 30.0%
Consumer Gds 0.361 0.577 0.555 59.7% 53.8%
 Health Care 0.365 0.524 0.448 43.7% 22.9%
Consumer Svs 0.487 0.562 0.565 15.5% 16.0%
Telecom 0.457 0.731 0.541 59.9% 18.3%
Utilities 0.380 0.762 0.502 100.4% 31.9%
Financials 0.449 0.609 0.510 35.6% 13.5%
Technology 0.342 0.390 0.379 14.2% 10.8%
Average 0.440 0.596 0.534
% increase
 
Table notes: The numbers above represent the average of the correlations amongst the industry portfolios for the U.S., 
Developed Markets ex NA and the Emerging Markets. The % increase is simply the change in correlation for the period 
relative to the correlation measured in the pre-crisis period. 
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Table 12: Temporal Pattern of Daily Correlations Among the Pacific Market, the European Market and the U.S. Market 
 
Daily Correlations 
2007-Aug 2008
PAC EUR US PAC EUR US PAC EUR US
PAC t 0.004 0.490 0.591 1.000 0.370 0.073 0.004 -0.044 -0.051
EUR t -0.044 -0.124 0.290 0.370 1.000 0.484 0.490 -0.124 -0.097
USA t -0.051 -0.097 -0.163 0.073 0.484 1.000 0.591 0.290 -0.163
9/12 - 10/27
PAC EUR US PAC EUR US PAC EUR US
PAC t 0.084 0.481 0.806 1.000 0.657 0.123 0.084 -0.365 -0.290
EUR t -0.365 -0.113 0.354 0.657 1.000 0.646 0.481 -0.113 -0.245
USA t -0.290 -0.245 -0.174 0.123 0.646 1.000 0.806 0.354 -0.174
t-1 t t+1
t-1 t t+1
 
Table Notes: The numbers represent the correlation over the specified time period for the return to the market in the first 
column on day t and the return to the market in the column on day t-1, t or t+1.  The results provide an indication of the 
patterns of price shock transmission around the globe.  The top set of numbers is the pre-crisis period and the bottom numbers 
are the peak crisis period. 
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Appendix: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions for the Financial Crisis 
Sources: 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/timeline/default.cfm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/08/creditcrunch.marketturmoil/print
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/30/us.bailout.timeline/index.htm l
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=16318432
 
February 7, 2007 (Sun) 
HSBC announces losses linked to U.S. subprime mortgages. 
 
February 27, 2007 (Tue) 
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announces that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities. 
 
April 2, 2007 (Mon) 
New Century Financial Corporation, a leading subprime mortgage lender, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
 
May 17, 2007 (Thu) 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said growing number of mortgage defaults will not seriously harm the U.S. economy. 
 
June 2007 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Services downgrade over 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime mortgages. 
 
June 7, 2007 (Thu) 
Bear Stearns informs investors that it is suspending redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. 
 
June 28, 2007 (Thu) 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) votes to maintain its target for the federal funds rate at 5.25 percent. 
 
July 11, 2007 (Wed) 
Standard and Poor’s places 612 securities backed by subprime residential mortgages on a credit watch. 
 
July 24, 2007 (Tue) 
Countrywide Financial Corporation warns of “difficult conditions.” 
 
July 31, 2007 (Tue) 
Bear Stearns liquidates two hedge funds that invested in various types of mortgage backed securities. 
  
August 6, 2007 (Mon) 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
 
August 7, 2007 (Tue) 
The FOMC votes to maintain its target for the federal funds rate at 5.25 percent. 
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August 9, 2007 (Thu) 
BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, halts redemptions on three investment funds. 
 
August 10, 2007 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it “will provide reserves as necessary…to promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to the FOMC’s target 
rate of 5.25 percent. In current circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs because of dislocations in money and credit markets. As 
always, the discount window is available as a source of funding 
 
August 16, 2007 (Thu) 
Fitch Ratings downgrades Countrywide Financial Corporation to BBB+, its third lowest investment-grade rating, and Countrywide borrows the entire $11.5 billion 
available in its credit lines with other banks. 
 
August 17, 2007 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 50 basis points to 5.75 percent, bringing the rate to only 50 basis points above the FOMC’s federal 
funds rate target.  The Board also increases the maximum primary credit borrowing term to 30 days, renewable by the borrower. 
 
September 14, 2007 (Fri) 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer authorizes the Bank of England to provide liquidity support for Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest mortgage lender. 
 
September 18, 2007 (Tue) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 4.75 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 50 
basis points to 5.25 percent. 
 
October 1, 2007 (Mon) 
Swiss bank UBS announces losses liked to U.S. subprime mortgages. 
 
October 5, 2007 (Fri) 
Investment bank Merrill Lynch reports losses of $5.5 billion. 
 
October 10, 2007 (Wed) 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson announces the HOPE NOW initiative, an alliance of investors, servicers, mortgage market participants, and credit and homeowners’ 
counselors encouraged by the Treasury Department and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
 
October 15, 2007 (Mon) 
Citigroup, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase announce plans for an $80 billion Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit to purchase highly rated assets from exist-
ing special purpose vehicles. 
  
Citigroup announces $6.5 billion third quarter losses. 
 
October 24, 2007 (Wed) 
Merrill Lynch announces losses to be over $8 billion. 
 
October 31, 2007 (Wed) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 4.50 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 25 
 50
basis points to 5.00 percent. 
 
November 2007 
Financial market pressures intensify, reflected in diminished liquidity in interbank funding markets. 
 
December 11, 2007 (Tue) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 4.25 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 25 
basis points to 4.75 percent. 
 
December 12, 2007 (Wed) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of a Term Auction Facility (TAF) in which fixed amounts of term funds will be auctioned to depository institutions 
against a wide variety of collateral. 
 
The FOMC authorizes temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The Fed 
states that it will provide up to $20 billion and $4 billion to the ECB and SNB, respectively, for up to 6 months. 
 
December 21, 2007 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that TAF auctions will be conducted every two weeks as long as financial market conditions warrant. 
 
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America abandon plans for the Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, announcing that the fund “is not needed at this 
time.”    
 
January 11, 2008 (Fri) 
Bank of America announces that it will purchase Countrywide Financial in an all-stock transaction worth approximately $4 billion. 
 
January 15, 2008 (Tue) 
Citigroup reports $18.1 billion loss in fourth quarter. 
 
January 17, 2008 (Thu) 
Merrill Lynch reports $11.5 billion loss in fourth quarter. Washington Mutual posts losses. 
 
January 18, 2008 (Fri) 
Fitch Ratings downgrades Ambac Financial Group’s insurance financial strength rating to AA, Credit Watch Negative. Standard and Poor’s place Ambac’s AAA rating 
on Credit Watch Negative.  (Ambac is US’s second largest bond insurer) 
 
Spring-Nextel announce 4,000 layoffs. 
 
Bush Administration announces details of stimulus plan to avert economic slowdown in speech.  Plan call for a stimulus id $145B largely in the form of tax cuts that 
would provide up to $800 per person. Concern is expressed over lack of quick stimulus to those who pay not federal taxes 
 
January 22, 2008 (Tue) 
In an intermeeting conference call, the FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 75 basis points to 3.5 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to 
reduce the primary credit rate 75 basis points to 4 percent. 
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January 30, 2008 (Wed) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 3 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 50 basis 
points to 3.5 percent. 
 
Swiss bank UBS announces fourth quarter losses at $14 billion. 
 
February 13, 2008 (Wed) 
President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-185) into law. Public Law 110-185 
 
February 17, 2008 (Sun) 
Northern Rock is taken into state ownership by the Treasury of the United Kingdom. 
  
March 5, 2008 (Wed) 
Carlyle Capital Corporation receives a default notice after failing to meet margin calls on its mortgage bond fund. 
 
March 7, 2008 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces $50 billion TAF auctions on March 10 and March 24 and extends the TAF for at least 6 months 
 
The Board also initiates a series of term repurchase transactions, expected to cumulate to $100 billion, conducted as 28-day term repurchase agreements with primary 
dealers. 
 
March 11, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which will lend up to $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28-day 
terms against federal agency debt, federal agency residential mortgage-backed securities 
  
(MBS), non-agency AAA/Aaa private label residential MBS, and other securities. 
 
The FOMC increases its swap lines with the ECB by $10 billion and the Swiss NationalBank by $2 billion and also extends these lines through Sept. 30, 2008. 
 
March 14, 2008 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board approves the financing arrangement announced by JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns [see note for March 24]. The Federal Reserve Board 
also announces they are “monitoring market developments closely and will continue to provide liquidity as necessary to promote the orderly function of the financial 
system 
 
March 16, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Reserve Board establishes the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF),  extending credit to primary dealers at the primary credit rate against a broad 
range of investment grade securities. 
  
The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 25 basis points to 3.25 percent, lowering the spread between the primary credit rate and FOMC tar-
get for the federal funds rate to 25 basis points.  The Board also votes to increase the maximum maturity of primary credit loans to 90 days. 
 
Bear Stearns, the U.S.'s fifth largest investment bank, collapses and is taken over by JP Morgan. 
 
March 18, 2008 (Tue) 
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The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 75 basis points to 2.25 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 75 
basis points to 2.50 percent. 
 
March 24, 2008 (Mon) 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces that it will provide term financing to facilitate JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s acquisition of The Bear Stearns Compa-
nies Inc. A limited liability company (Maiden Lane) is formed to control $30 billion of Bear Stearns assets that are pledged as security for $29 billion in term financing 
from the New York Fed at its primary credit rate. JP Morgan Chase will assume the first $1 billion of any losses on the portfolio. 
 
April 1, 2008 (Tue) 
German Deutsche Bank reports credit losses of $3.9 billion in first quarter. 
 
April 13, 2008 (Sun) 
U.S. bank Wachovia Corp. reports big loss for quarter. 
 
April 30, 2008 (Wed) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 25 basis 
points to 2.25 percent. 
 
May 2, 2008 (Fri) 
The FOMC expands the list of eligible collateral for Schedule 2 TSLF auctions to include AAA/Aaa-rated asset-backed securities, in addition to already eligible resi-
dential and commercial MBS and agency collateralized mortgage obligations 
 
The FOMC also increases existing swap lines with the ECB by $20 billion and with the Swiss National Bank by $6 billion. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board expands TAF auctions from $50 billion to $75 billion. 
 
May 12, 2008 (Mon) 
HSBC writes off $3.2 billion in the first quarter linked to exposure to the U.S. subprime market. 
 
June 5, 2008 (Thu) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces approval of the notice of Bank of America to acquire Countrywide Financial Corporation. 
 
Standard and Poor’s downgrades monoline bond insurers AMBAC and MBIA from AAA to AA. 
    
June 25, 2008 (Wed) 
The FOMC votes to maintain its target for the federal funds rate at 2.00 percent 
 
July 11, 2008 (Fri) 
The Office of Thrift Supervision closes IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announces the transfer of the insured deposits and 
most assets of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. to IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB.  (IndyMac is the largest thrift ever to fail in the US.) 
 
July 13, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), should such lending prove necessary. 
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The U.S. Treasury Department announces a temporary increase in the credit lines of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and a temporary authorization for the Treasury to 
purchase equity in either GSE if needed. 
 
July 15, 2008 (Tue) 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) issues an emergency order temporarily prohibiting naked short selling in the securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
primary dealers at commercial and investment banks. 
 
July 22, 2008 (Tue) 
WaMu reports $3.3 billion loss for second quarter. 
 
July 30, 2008 (Wed) 
President Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-289), which, among other provisions, authorizes the Treasury to pur-
chase GSE obligations and reforms the regulatory supervision of the GSEs under a new Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board extends the TSLF and PDCF through January 30, 2009, introduces auctions of options on $50 billion of draws on the TSLF, and intro-
duces 84-day TAF loans. 
 
The FOMC increases its swap line with the ECB to $55 billion. 
 
August 5, 2008 (Tue) 
The FOMC votes to maintain its target for the federal funds rate at 2.00 percent 
 
August 17, 2008 (Sun) 
Following an intermeeting conference call, the FOMC releases a statement about the current financial market turmoil, and notes that the “downside risks to growth 
have increased appreciably.” 
 
August 31, 2008 (Sun) 
German Commerzbank AG takes over Dresdner Kleinwort investment bank. 
 
September 7, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship. The U.S. Treasury Department announces three 
additional measures to complement the FHFA’s decision: 1) Preferred stock purchase agreements between the Treasury/FHFA and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
ensure the GSEs positive net worth; 2) a new secured lending facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks; and 3) a 
temporary program to purchase GSE MBS. 
 
September 9, 2008 (Tue) 
Lehman Brothers shares plummet to lowest level on Wall Street in more than a decade. 
 
September 10, 2008 (Wed) 
Lehman Brothers puts itself up for sale after reporting a $4 billion loss and says it will spin off its troubled commercial real estate assets. 
 
September 12, 2008 (Fri) 
1pm EST: With Lehman Brothers facing collapse, US officials struggle to find a buyer for the distressed investment bank. 
 54
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/12/lehmanbrothers.creditcrunch
 
September 13, 2008 (Sat) 
9am EST: Teams of bankers flood the New York Federal Reserve building for the weekend to explore options for Lehman. Bank of America and Barclays head list of 
potential purchasers. 
 
September 14, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Reserve Board expands the list of eligible collateral for the PDCF to include any collateral that can be pledged in the tri-party repo system of the two ma-
jor clearing banks. Previously PDCF collateral had been limited to investment-grade debt securities. 
 
The Board also expands the list of collateral accepted by TSLF to include all investment-grade debt securities and increases the frequency of Schedule 2 TSLF auctions 
and total offering to $150 billion. 
 
The Board also adopts an interim final rule that provides temporary exceptions to Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act to allow insured depository institutions to 
provide liquidity to their affiliates for assets typically funded in the tri-party repo market. 
 
9am EST: Talks over Lehman run into a third day. Traffic in New York snarls up under the sheer weight of backed-up, blacked-out limousines transporting the 
stressed-out bankers.  In a weekend of furious negotiations, U.S. regulators make it clear there will be no government bailout for Lehman Brothers. 
 
3pm EST: Barclays pulls out of the bidding and Bank of America turns its attention to Merrill Lynch. 
 
September 15, 2008 (Mon) 
11pm EST (Sun):  Bank of America announces its intent to purchase Merrill Lynch & Co. for $50 billion. 
 
12.30am EST: Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. SEC Filing 
 
2am EST: 4,500 Lehman staff at its Canary Wharf HQ are told it's all over. 
 
4am EST: Shares in HBOS, Britain's biggest mortgage lender, crash 34% in early trading. 
 
11.30am EST: FTSE 100 closes almost 4% lower at 5,202.4, a 210-point drop, wiping out £50bn of value. 
  
3pm EST: US authorities trying to put a rescue package together for insurance giant AIG agree on a $20bn lifeline. 
  
4pm EST: On Wall Street the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunges 504 points to close at 10917.51. 
 
September 16, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) under Section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
 
The FOMC votes to maintain its target for the federal funds rate at 2.00 percent. 
 
The net asset value of shares in the Reserve Primary Money Fund falls below $1, primarily due to losses on Lehman Brothers commercial paper and medium‐term 
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notes 
 
2.30am EST: Barclays confirms that it is still talking to Lehman about buying some assets. 
  
10am EST: Pressure piles on HBOS, whose shares are still down 30%, with a downgrade from Standard & Poor's. 
  
4pm EST: Dow finishes up 141.5 points at 11,059 after zig-zagging around all day. 
 
5pm EST: Barclays seals deal for Lehman's US assets. 
    
September 17, 2008 (Wed) 
The U.S. Treasury Department announces a Supplementary Financing Program consisting of a series of Treasury bill issues that will provide cash for use in Federal 
Reserve initiatives. 
 
3:30am EST: US government agrees to give AIG $85bn to keep afloat, in return for control of the company. 
  
5am EST: Russia suspends stock market trading. 
  
7am EST: Libor - the borrowing rate banks charge each other - hits a seven-year high as the panic escalates. 
 
8am EST: Barclays hints that it might buy Lehman's UK assets too. 
  
10am EST: Bank of England extends its special liquidity scheme, after pressure from banks. 
  
11am EST: Morgan Stanley shares fall 30%, as it become the latest bank under fire. 
 
1.30pm EST: Merrill Lynch's John Thain defends $200m bonus pool for top brass. 
 
2pm EST: Reports emerge that regulators are probing the practice of "naked" short sellers.  The SEC announces a temporary emergency ban on short selling in the 
stocks of all companies in the financial sector. 
 
4.30pm EST: HBOS takeover is finalized with Lloyds TSB. 
  
7pm EST: Morgan Stanley looks for salvation through a merger with Wachovia. 
 
September 18, 2008 (Thu) 
The FOMC expands existing swap lines by $180 billion and authorizes new swap lines with the Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and Bank of Canada. 
 
1am EST: Russian stock markets remain closed for a second day. 
 
2am EST: £12.2bn takeover of HBOS is announced to the City, amid fears of massive job cuts. 
 
4am EST: Gold is at a six-week high as investors flee shares and pile into commodities. 
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5am EST: Central banks around the world pump $180bn into the system in a concerted effort to end the crisis. 
 
6am EST: India's stock market fluctuates wildly - with shares plunging before recovering after the government promises to help. 
 
9am EST: Christopher Cox, America's most senior financial markets regulator, takes aim at short sellers. 
 
10am EST: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley shares fall sharply again on Wall Street. 
 
1pm EST: UK's Financial Services Authority announces a ban on the short-selling of bank shares. 
 
4pm EST: Wall Street closes 410 points higher as the US Federal Reserve starts briefing on an ambitious plan to create a federal "bad bank". 
 
September 19, 2008 (Fri) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) to extend non-
recourse loans at the primary credit rate to U.S. depository institutions and bank holding companies to finance their purchase of high-quality asset-backed commercial 
paper from money market mutual funds. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board also announces plans to purchase federal agency discount notes (short-term debt obligations issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks) from primary dealers. 
  
The U.S. Treasury Department announces a temporary guaranty program that will make available up to $50 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee 
investments in participating money market mutual funds. 
 
3am EST: UK FSA names the 29 firms it hopes to save by banning short-selling. 
 
5.30am EST: Russian stock markets bounce back after the government pledges 500bn rubles to fight the crisis. 
 
UK government rushes through increase in guarantees for British bank deposits to £50,000. 
 
Wells Fargo scuppers Citigroup's takeover of Wachovia. 
 
US jobs data are worse than expected. 
 
September 20, 2008 (Sat) 
The U.S. Treasury Department submits draft legislation to Congress for authority to purchase troubled assets. 
 
Paulson spends the weekend trying to thrash out his $700bn "bad bank" plan. 
 
September 21, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Reserve Board approves applications of investment banking companies Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to become bank holding companies. 
 
The Financial Services Authority holds crisis talks over a possible bail-out of Bradford & Bingley, which has seen its shares plunge 90% this year so far. 
 
The administrator PWC battles to sell Lehman Brothers' UK operations. 
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September 22, 2008 (Mon) 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs give up their status as investment banks and become traditional commercial banks that accept deposits from ordinary people and 
businesses, marking a dramatic change in the make-up of Wall Street. 
 
Japan's Nomura buys Lehman Brothers' Asian operations. 
 
Robert Willumstad, the departing head of AIG, gives up his $22m (£12m) golden parachute. 
 
September 23, 2008 (Tue) 
Political opposition to the $700bn bail-out plan grows in Washington, pushing shares prices lower. 
 
The FSA starts to name and shame the bank short-sellers. 
 
September 24, 2008 (Wed) 
The FOMC establishes new swap lines with the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Sveriges Riksbank for up to $10 billion each and with the Danmarks Nationalbank 
and the Norges Bank for up to $5 billion each. The swap lines are authorized through  January 30, 2009 
 
Warren Buffett invests $5bn (£2.7bn) in Goldman Sachs and warns that failure to agree a $700bn bailout could result in an "economic Pearl Harbor". 
 
The FBI starts an investigation into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG and Lehman Brothers over their role in the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
 
Henry Paulson bows to intense pressure to include limits on what Wall Street bankers can be paid in his $700bn bail-out plan. 
 
Gordon Brown tells world leaders in New York that an international regulator may be needed to stop the mess being repeated. 
 
September 25, 2008 (Thu) 
The Office of Thrift Supervision closes Washington Mutual Bank. JPMorgan Chase acquires the banking operations of Washington Mutual in a transaction facilitated 
by the FDIC. 
 
Ireland becomes the first state in the eurozone to fall into recession. 
  
Jobless figures are up and orders are down in the US, signaling the dire state of the economy. 
 
Even one of America's largest companies, GE, is not immune from the "unprecedented weakness and volatility" of the world's financial markets and profits slide. 
 
Overnight the $700bn bail-out plan in the US appears to have stalled. 
 
September 26, 2008 (Fri) 
The FOMC increases existing swap lines with the ECB by $10 billion and the Swiss National Bank by $3 billion.  Federal Reserve Press Release 
 
America's biggest savings and loan company, Washington Mutual – or WaMu – is seized by federal regulators overnight and sold to JP Morgan for $1.9bn in a deal that 
sends shockwaves through Wall Street and main street alike. 
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Traders are worried about the possible failure of the $700bn bail-out plan and the FTSE 100 slides into the red again. The plan appears to be coming apart despite 
Paulson actually begging on one knee for the deal to be passed. 
 
September 28, 2008 (Sun) 
In the US, the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, pleads with representatives to pass the now 100-page plan to save Wall Street. 
 
September 29, 2008 (Mon) 
The FOMC authorizes a $330 billion expansion of swap lines with Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Danmarks Nationalbank, ECB, Norges Bank, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sveriges Riksbank, and Swiss National Bank Swap lines outstanding now total $620 billion. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board expands the TAF, announcing an increase in the size of the 84-day maturity auction to $75 billion and two forward TAF auctions totaling 
$150 billion to provide short-term (one- to two-week) TAF credit over year-end. 
 
The U.S. Treasury Department opens its Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds [see note for September 19]. The temporary guarantee program 
provides coverage to shareholders for amounts that they held in participating money market funds as of the close of business on September 19, 2008. 
 
The FDIC announces that Citigroup will purchase the banking operations of Wachovia Corporation. The FDIC agrees to enter into a loss-sharing arrangement with 
Citigroup on a $312 billion pool of loans, with Citigroup absorbing the first $42 billion of losses and the FDIC absorbing losses beyond that. In return, Citigroup 
would grant the FDIC $12 billion in preferred stock and warrants. 
 
The U.S. House of Representatives rejects legislation submitted by the Treasury Department requesting authority to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions 
[see note for September 20]. 
 
Wall Street has a fit. The Dow Jones plunges 777 points, its biggest ever fall in points terms. 
 
Europe: As a result of the intense fear among bankers about which institution will be next to fold, the interbank lending rate goes through the roof despite desperate 
attempts by Central Banks to pump cash into the system. 
 
UK: UK’s Bradford & Bingley is nationalized, with Santander to buy deposits for $38.2bn. As news of the Bradford & Bingley rescue sinks in, the London stock mar-
ket plummets in what will end up being one of the FTSE 100 index's worst ever trading days. 
 
Iceland: The government is forced to take control of one of the nation’s biggest banks, Glitnir. 
 
Belgium: Belgian giant Fortis is bailed out by Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
 
September 30, 2008 (Tue) 
Asian stock markets are the first to react to the shock news that the $700bn Wall Street bailout has failed. When London opens it is carnage with banking shares clob-
bered. 
 
In the US, July has reported the biggest ever fall in house prices. 
 
The banks themselves are finding it increasingly difficult to raise financing with the cost of inter-bank borrowing experiencing its biggest ever one-day rise. 
 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing director of the IMF, believes a bail-out is the only option for the US economy. 
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Irish government guarantees safety of bonds, debts and deposits. 
 
October 2, 2008 (Thu) 
The US Senate has voted in favor of the Wall Street bail-out. 
 
European leaders are considering their own bail-out, which could cost up to €300bn (£237bn). The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, leads the push. 
 
Hopes that the US deal may get through help shares prices recover somewhat in London. 
 
But by the close of play, Wall Street still has the jitters. 
 
October 3, 2008 (Fri) 
Wells Fargo announces a competing proposal to purchase Wachovia Corporation that does not require assistance from the FDIC. 
 
Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the Emergency Economic  Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-343), which establishes the $700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  H.R. 1424 
 
US jobs data are worse than expected. 
 
October 4, 2008 (Sat) 
Europe: Brown attends an emergency summit in Paris to discuss the crisis with his French, German and Italian counterparts. 
 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel announces guarantee of deposits in German banks. 
 
October 6, 2008 (Mon) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that the Fed will pay interest on depository institutions’ required and excess reserve balances at an average of the federal funds 
target rate less 10 basis points on required reserves and less 75 basis points on excess reserves. 
 
Danish government announces plan to guarantee bank deposits. 
 
Wells Fargo and Citigroup agree to legal standstill in battle for Wachovia. 
 
Bank of America reports 68% profit drop and announces stock sale to raise $10bn. 
 
 October 7, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which will provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of com-
mercial paper through a special purpose vehicle that will purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper directly from eligible issuers. 
  
The FDIC announces an increase in deposit insurance coverage to $250,000 per depositor as authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.   
 
London, 7.30pm BST: Darling confirms the government will make a historic announcement tomorrow on changes to the banking system. It is thought it will involve 
using £50bn of taxpayers' money to take a major stake in high street banks. 
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Icelandic bank Landsbanki is nationalized, and Icesave, Landsbanki’s internet bank, freezes accounts. 
 
October 8, 2008 (Wed) 
2.30am EST: UK Treasury announces what amounts to a £500bn bank rescue package to stop the country's financial system melting down. Most bank shares fall 
again. 
 
7.00am EST:  The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 1.50 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary 
credit rate 50 basis points to 1.75 percent. 
  
UK, China, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and ECB also cut interest rates. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to borrow up to $37.8 billion in investment-grade, fixed-income securities from Ameri-
can International Group (AIG) in return for cash collateral.  Federal Reserve Press Release 
 
London: Icesave accounts are declared in default. This move triggers Financial Services Compensation Scheme which will return 100% of savers' money. 
 
The FTSE 100 closes down 238.5 points at 4366.7, a 5.2% decline and its lowest level since 19 August 2004. Around £57bn is wiped off the value of Britain's top 
companies. 
 
IMF forecasts “major global downturn.” 
 
October 9, 2008 (Thu) 
The International Monetary Fund announces emergency plans to bail out governments affected by the financial crisis, after warning that no country would be immune 
from the ripple effects of the credit crunch. 
 
Iceland nationalizes its biggest bank Kaupthing. 
 
October 10, 2008 (Fri) – BLACK FRIDAY 
A global rout starts in Asia as recession fears deepen, with Japan's Nikkei index falling almost 10%, its biggest drop for 20 years. 
 
Singapore officially slides into recession on the back of falling demand for manufacturing exports from US and Europe. 
 
3.07am EST: The FTSE 100 plunges more than 10% to 3847 points, careering through the 4,000 mark for the first time in five years. The sell-off wipes more than 
£100bn off the value of Britain's biggest companies. 
 
Oil prices slump to $80 a barrel as energy watchdog drops demand forecast. Prices tumble by almost $5 a barrel to a one-year low amid growing fears that the deepen-
ing financial crisis will squash demand for fuel. 
 
9.40am EST: The Dow crashes nearly 700 points in the first few minutes of trading.  President Bush urges confidence in the US government's ability to manage the 
worsening financial crisis, but his words have little effect. 
 
12.10pm EST: The FTSE 100 closes 8.85% lower at 3932.1 – a 381.7 point fall, wiping about £89.5bn off the value of Britain's biggest companies. This is the worst 
daily fall since the crash of 1987, beating Monday's 7.85% decline. 
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October 11, 2008 (Sat) 
G7 finance ministers and the IMF meet in Washington. The G7 comes up with a five-point plan, which includes spending billions of taxpayers' money to rebuild the 
global banking system and reopen the flow of credit. 
 
The head of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn tells a Washington meeting: "Intensifying  solvency concerns about a number of the largest US-based and European 
financial institutions have pushed the global financial system to the brink of systemic meltdown." 
 
October 12, 2008 (Sun) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces its approval of an application by Wells Fargo & Co. to acquire Wachovia Corporation. 
 
Gordon Brown travels to Paris where European officials are desperate to prevent a continent-wide meltdown in the banking sector. He succeeds in persuading the 
EU's core countries to adopt a plan along the lines of his £500bn banking system bail-out.  Leaders agree to guarantee loans between banks until the end of 2009. 
 
Australia agrees to guarantee deposits for the next 3 years. 
 
New Zealand guarantees bank deposits for 2 years. 
 
October 13, 2008 (Mon) 
The FOMC increases existing swap lines with foreign central banks. The Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Swiss National Bank announce that they will 
conduct tenders of USD funding at 7-, 28-, and 84-day maturities at fixed interest rates. 
 
5.30am EST: At a Downing Street press conference, Gordon Brown says the unprecedented cash injection into the UK banking sector was essential and he predicts 
other countries will follow Britain's lead. "The government cannot just leave people on their own to be buffeted about," he says. UK bails out 3 banks: RBS, HBOS 
and Lloyds TSB at the cost of $63bn. Bank of England loans $174mn to Icelandic bank Landsbanki to help repay UK depositors. 
 
The 15 members of the eurozone, led by Germany and France, unveil large, coordinated plans along British lines to provide their banks with capital funding. 
 
The prospect of governments pumping vast sums into banks on both sides of the Atlantic sends stocks soaring. 
  
October 14, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve announces additional details of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). 
  
The FOMC increases its swap line with the Bank of Japan 
 
U.S. Treasury Department announces the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that will purchase capital in financial institutions under the authority of the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The U.S. Treasury will make available $250 billion of capital to U.S. financial institutions. This facility will allow banking 
organizations to apply for a preferred stock investment by the U.S. Treasury. Nine large financial organizations announce their intention to subscribe to the facility in 
an aggregate amount of $125 billion. 
 
The FDIC creates a new Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program to guarantee the senior debt of all FDIC-insured institutions and their holding companies, as well as 
deposits in non-interest-bearing deposit transaction through June 30, 2009. 
 
Shares in Asia, London and the rest of Europe rallied for a second day as the financial world waited for America to follow Britain's lead and partially nationalize its 
banks. 
 62
 
Afternoon: Meetings between the US government and the heads of major banks were held in Washington. 
 
October 15, 2008 (Wed) 
US banks JP Morgan and Wells Fargo reported big falls in profits, and retail sales in the US suffered their biggest fall in three years, with the decline in car sales hitting 
3.8%. 
 
UK: Unemployment figures in the UK showed the biggest rise since the country's last recession 17 years ago, up to 5.7% – 1.79 million people. 
 
Iceland rushed to stave off economic ruin by slashing interest rates by 3.5% and pursuing talks with Russia over the possibility of a multibillion euro loan. 
 
Southeast Asian nations agree to start fund to provide financial support to countries in crisis. World Bank commits $10bn to the planned fund. 
 
European and Asian stock markets fall after initial upswing. Russian stock market posts losses as RTS Index falls below 800 points. 
 
October 16, 2008 (Thu) 
In the US, Citigroup suffered its fourth consecutive quarterly loss after taking hits of more than $13bn to cover liabilities arising from the credit crunch. 
 
In Japan, the Prime Minister, Taro Aso, dismissed the US bank bail-out as "insufficient", in the first real sign of a split among the world's richest countries on how to 
address the credit crunch and looming global recession. 
 
OPEC called an emergency meeting in Vienna as the oil price fell to less than half the $147 it traded at in July. 
 
Swiss government bails out UBS with $59.2bn. 
 
Hungarian central bank gets cash injection from ECB to the value of $6.7bn. 
 
EU leaders at Brussels summit call for complete overhaul of international financial system. 
 
October 21, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). Under the facility, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
provides senior secured funding to a series of special purpose vehicles to facilitate the purchase of assets from eligible investors, such as U.S. money market mutual 
funds. Among the assets the facility will purchase are USD-denominated certificates of deposit and commercial paper issued by highly rated financial institutions with a 
maturity of 90 days or less. 
  
China warned the financial crisis was damaging its economic growth. 
 
October 22, 2008 (Wed) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it will alter the formula used to determine the interest rate paid to depository institutions on excess reserve balances. The 
new rate will be set equal to the lowest FOMC target rate in effect during the reserve maintenance period less 35 basis points. 
 
The stricken US bank Wachovia reported the biggest quarterly loss of any bank since the onset of the credit crunch, with a deficit of $24bn - more than the total price 
being paid for the North Carolina lender by its rival Wells Fargo. 
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Pakistan sought emergency bail-out funds from the IMF. 
 
October 23, 2008 (Thu) 
Former Fed chief Alan Greenspan admitted he had been "partially wrong" in his hands-off approach towards the banking industry. The credit crunch had left him in a 
state of "shocked disbelief," he admitted before a congressional committee. 
 
October 24, 2008 (Fri) 
PNC Financial Services Group Inc. purchases National City Corporation, creating the fifth largest U.S. bank. 
  
UK: Shares and the pound slumped as official government figures confirmed that the UK economy was shrinking, with the biggest drop in GDP since 1990. 
 
October 27, 2008 (Mon) 
The specter of a cascade of failing economies from the Baltic to Turkey was raised as a $16.5bn IMF bailout for Ukraine was mired in political infighting and Hungary 
sought its own $10bn rescue package. 
 
October 28, 2008 (Tue) 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $125 billion in preferred stock in nine U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program.  Treasury Department CPP 
Transaction Report 
 
The FOMC and Reserve Bank of New Zealand establish a $15 billion swap line. Federal Reserve Press Release 
 
Autumn's market mayhem has left the world's financial institutions nursing losses of $2.8tn, the Bank of England said, as it called for fundamental reform of the global 
banking system. 
 
October 29, 2008 (Wed) 
The FOMC votes to reduce its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 1.00 percent. The Federal Reserve Board reduces the primary credit rate 50 basis 
points to 1.25 percent.  Federal Reserve Press Release 
 
The FOMC also establishes swap lines with the Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore for up to $30 
billion each.  Federal Reserve Press Release 
  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces the creation of a short-term liquidity facility for market-access countries. 
 
The International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank announced a massive rescue package for Hungary. 
 
The prospect of fresh cuts in interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic helped propel Wall Street stocks to a dramatic rebound, with the Dow scoring its second-
biggest points gain ever, just short of 900. 
 
October 30, 2008 (Thu) 
Deutsche Bank reported steep falls in pre-tax and net profits and a further series of write-downs in the third quarter. 
 
October 31, 2008 (Fri) 
The Bank of Japan cut interest rates for the first time in seven years in response to the global financial crisis. The bank cut the key interest rate from 0.5% to 0.3%, a 
move some criticized as half-hearted. 
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November 5, 2008 (Wed) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it will alter the formula used to determine the interest rate paid to depository institutions on required and excess reserve 
balances. The rate on required reserves will be set equal to the average target federal funds rate over the reserve maintenance period. The rate on excess balances will 
be set equal to the lowest FOMC target rate in effect during the reserve maintenance period. 
 
November 10, 2008 (Mon) 
The Federal Reserve Board approves the applications of American Express and American Express Travel Related Services to become bank holding companies. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury Department announce a restructuring of the government’s financial support of AIG. The Treasury will purchase $40 
billion of AIG preferred shares under the TARP program, a portion of which will be used to reduce the Federal Reserve’s loan to AIG from $85 billion to $60 billion. 
The terms of the loan are modified to reduce the interest rate to the three-month LIBOR plus 300 basis points and lengthen the term of the loan from two to five 
years. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board also authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to establish two new lending facilities for AIG: The Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities Facility will lend up to $22.5 billion to a newly formed limited liability company (LLC) to purchase residential MBS from AIG; the Collateralized Debt Obli-
gations Facility will lend up to $30 billion to a newly formed LLC to purchase CDOs from AIG (Maiden Lane III LLC). 
 
November 11, 2008 (Tue) 
The U.S. Treasury Department announces a new streamlined loan modification program with cooperation from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and the HOPE NOW alliance. 
 
November 12, 2008 (Wed) 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson formally announces that the Treasury has decided not to use TARP funds to purchase illiquid mortgage-related assets from financial 
institutions. 
 
November 14, 2008 (Fri) 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $33.5 billion in preferred stock in 21 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program.    
 
November 14-17, 2008 (Fri-Mon) 
Three large U.S. life insurance companies seek TARP funding: Lincoln National, Hartford Financial Services Group, and Genworth Financial announce their inten-
tions to purchase lenders/depositories and thus qualify as savings and loan companies to access TARP funding. 
 
November 18, 2008 (Tue) 
Executives of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler testify before Congress, requesting access to the TARP for federal loans. 
 
November 20, 2008 (Thu) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announce that they will suspend mortgage foreclosures until January 2009. 
 
November 21, 2008 (Fri) 
The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will help liquidate The Reserve Fund’s U.S. Government Fund. The Treasury agrees to serve as a buyer of last resort 
for the fund’s securities to ensure the orderly liquidation of the fund.   
 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $3 billion in preferred stock in 23 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
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November 23, 2008 (Sun) 
The U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC jointly announce an agreement with Citigroup to provide a package of guarantees, liquidity access, 
and capital. Citigroup will issue preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC in exchange for protection against losses on a $306 billion pool of commercial and residen-
tial securities  held by Citigroup. The Federal Reserve will backstop residual risk in the asset pool through a non-recourse loan. In addition, the Treasury will invest an 
additional $20 billion in Citigroup from the TARP. 
 
November 25, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Facility (TALF), under which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will lend 
up to $200 billion on a non-recourse basis to holders of AAA-rated asset-backed securities and recently originated consumer and small business loans. The U.S. Treas-
ury will provide $20 billion of TARP money for credit protection. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board announces a new program to purchase direct obligations of housing related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)— Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Federal Home Loan Banks—and MBS backed by the GSEs. Purchases of up to $100 billion in GSE direct obligations will be conducted as auctions 
among Federal Reserve primary dealers. Purchases of up to $500 billion in MBS will be conducted by asset managers. 
 
November 26, 2008 (Wed) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces approval of the notice of Bank of America Corporation to acquire Merrill Lynch and Company. 
 
December 2, 2008 (Tue) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it will extend three liquidity facilities, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) through April 30, 2009. 
 
December 3, 2008 (Wed) 
The SEC approves measures to increase transparency and accountability at credit rating agencies and thereby ensure that firms provide more meaningful ratings and 
greater disclosure to investors. 
 
December 5, 2008 (Fri) 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $4 billion in preferred stock in 35 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
December 10, 2008 (Wed) 
The FDIC reiterates the guarantee of federal deposit insurance in the event of a bank failure. 
 
December 12, 2008 (Fri) 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $6.25 billion in preferred stock in 28 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
December 15, 2008 (Mon) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it has approved the application of PNC Financial Services to acquire National City Corporation. 
 
December 16, 2008 (Tue) 
The FOMC votes to establish a target range for the effective federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent. The Federal Reserve Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 
75 basis points to 0.50 percent. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board also establishes the interest rates on required reserve balances and excess balances at 0.25 percent for reserve maintenance periods begin-
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ning December 18, 2008. 
 
December 19, 2008 (Fri) 
The U.S. Treasury Department authorizes loans of up to $13.4 billion for General Motors and $4.0 billion for Chrysler from the TARP.   
 
The Federal Reserve Board announces revised terms and conditions of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).  Among the revisions are an extension 
of TALF loans from maturities of one year to three years and an expansion of eligible ABS collateral. 
 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $27.9 billion in preferred stock in 49 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
December 22, 2008 (Mon) 
The Federal Reserve Board approves the application of CIT Group Inc., an $81 billion financing company, to become a bank holding company.  The Board cites “un-
usual and exigent circumstances affecting the financial markets” for expeditious action on CIT Group’s application. 
 
December 24, 2008 (Wed) 
The Federal Reserve Board approves the applications of GMAC LLC and IB Finance Holding Company, LLC (IBFHC) to become bank holding companies, on con-
version of GMAC Bank, a $33 billion Utah industrial loan company, to a commercial bank.  GMAC Bank is a direct subsidiary of IBFHC and an indirect subsidiary of 
GMAC LLC, a $211 billion company.  The Board cites “unusual and exigent circumstances affecting the financial markets” for expeditious action on these applica-
tions.  As part of the  agreement, General Motors will reduce its ownership interest in GMAC to less than 10 percent. 
 
December 29, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will purchase $5 billion in equity from GMAC as part of its program to assist the domestic automotive industry. The 
Treasury also agrees to lend up to $1 billion to General Motors "so that GM can participate in a rights offering at GMAC in support of GMAC's reorganization as a 
bank holding company." This commitment is in addition to the support announced on December 19, 2008. 
 
December 30, 2008 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that it expects to begin to purchase mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae under a 
previously announced program in early January 2009 (see November 25, 2008). 
 
December 30, 2008 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) releases a report that recommends against the suspension of fair value accounting standards. The report was 
mandated by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). 
 
December 31, 2008 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $1.91 billion in preferred stock from seven U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
January 5, 2009 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York begins purchasing fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae under a 
program first announced on November 25, 2008. | 
 
January 7, 2008 
The Federal Reserve Board announces two changes to the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) that 1) expand the set of institutions eligible to partici-
pate in the MMIFF and 2) reduce the minimum yield on assets eligible to be sold to the MMIFF. 
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January 8, 2009 
Moody’s Investor Services issues a report suggesting that the Federal Home Loan Banks are currently facing the potential for significant accounting write-downs on 
their $76.2 billion private-label MBS securities portfolio. According to Moody’s, only four of 12 Banks’ capital ratios would remain above regulatory minimums under a 
worst-case scenario 
 
January 9, 2009 
The Congressional Oversight Panel issues its second monthly report on the expenditure of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $4.8 billion in preferred stock from 43 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
January 12, 2009 
The FDIC issues a letter to FDIC-supervised institutions calling on them to implement a process to monitor their use of capital injections, liquidity support and/or 
financing guarantees obtained through Treasury, FDIC, and Federal Reserve financial stability programs 
 
At the request of President-Elect Obama, President Bush submits a request to Congress for the remaining $350 billion in TARP funding for use by the incoming ad-
ministration. 
 
January 13, 2009 
The Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle reports that it will likely report a risk-based capital deficiency and suspend its dividend because of a decline in the market 
value of its mortgage-backed securities portfolio. The move follows a similar announcement on January 8 by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco. 
 
January 16, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $1.4 billion in preferred stock from 39 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
The Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC announce a package of guarantees, liquidity access, and capital for Bank of America. The Treasury and the FDIC will enter a 
loss-sharing arrangement with Bank of America on a $118 billion portfolio of loans, securities, and other assets in exchange for preferred shares. In addition, and if 
necessary, the Federal Reserve will provide a non-recourse loan to back-stop residual risk in the portfolio. Separately, the Treasury will invest $20 billion in Bank of 
America from the TARP in exchange for preferred stock. 
 
The Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC finalize terms of their guarantee agreement with Citigroup. (See announcement on November 23, 2008.) 
 
The Treasury Department announces that it will lend $1.5 billion from the TARP to a special purpose entity created by Chrysler Financial to finance the extension of 
new consumer auto loans. 
 
January 23, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $326 million in preferred stock from 23 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
January 28, 2009 
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Board announces that the NCUA will guarantee uninsured shares at all corporate credit unions through February 
2009 and establish a voluntary guarantee program for uninsured shares of credit unions through December 2010. The Board also approves a $1 billion capital purchase 
in U.S. Central Corporate Federal Credit Union. Corporate credit unions provide financing, check clearing, and other services to retail credit unions. 
 
January 30, 2009 
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The Board of Governors announces a policy to avoid preventable foreclosures on certain residential mortgage assets held, controlled or owned by a Federal Reserve 
Bank. The policy was developed pursuant to section 110 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. 
 
January 30, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $1.15 billion in preferred stock from 42 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
February 3, 2009 
The Federal Reserve announces the extension, through October 30, 2009, of the existing liquidity programs scheduled to expire on April 30, 2009.  The Board of Gov-
ernors and the FOMC note "continuing substantial strains in many financial markets." In addition, the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and other central banks 
are also extended to October 30, 2009.  The expiration date for the TALF remains December 31, 2009, and the TAF does not have an expiration date. 
 
February 6, 2009 
The Federal Reserve Board releases additional terms and conditions of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). Under the TALF, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York will lend up to $200 billion to eligible owners of certain AAA-rated asset-backed securities backed by newly and recently originated auto loans, 
credit card loans, student loans and SBA-guaranteed small business loans. 
 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $238.5 million in preferred stock from 28 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
February 10, 2009 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announces a Financial Stability Plan involving Treasury purchases of convertible preferred stock in eligible banks, the crea-
tion of a Public-Private Investment Fund to acquire troubled loans and other assets from financial institutions, expansion of the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and new initiatives to stem residential mortgage foreclosures and to support small business lending. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board announces that is prepared to expand the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to as much as $1 trillion and broaden the 
eligible collateral to include AAA-rated commercial mortgage-backed securities, private-label residential mortgage-backed securities, and other asset-backed securities. 
An expansion of the TALF would be supported by $100 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The Federal Reserve Board will announce the date 
that the TALF will commence operations later this month. 
 
February 13, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $429 million in preferred stock from 29 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
February 17, 2009 
The Treasury Department releases its first monthly survey of bank lending by the top 20 recipients of government investment through the Capital Purchase Program.  
The survey found that banks continued to originate, refinance and renew loans from the beginning of the program in October through December 2008. 
 
President Obama signs into law the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009", which includes a variety of spending measures and tax cuts intended to pro-
mote economic recovery. 
 
February 18, 2009 
President Obama announces The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.  The plan includes a program to permit the refinancing of conforming home mortgages 
owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac that currently exceed 80 percent of the value of the underlying home. The plan also creates a $75 billion Home-
owner Stability Initiative to modify the terms of eligible home loans to reduce monthly loan payments.  In addition, the Treasury Department will increase its preferred 
stock purchase agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to $200 billion, and increase the limits on the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's portfolios to $900 
billion. 
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February 23, 2009 
The Treasury Department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Reserve 
Board issue a joint statement that the U.S. government stands firmly behind the banking system, and that the government will ensure that banks have the capital and 
liquidity they need to provide the credit necessary to restore economic growth. Further, the agencies reiterate their determination to preserve the stability of systemi-
cally important financial institutions. 
 
February 24, 2009 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $365.4 million in preferred stock from 23 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
 
February 25, 2009 
The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision announce that they 
will conduct forward-looking economic assessments or "stress tests" of eligible U.S. bank holding companies with assets exceeding $100 billion. Supervisors will work 
with the firms to estimate the range of possible future losses and the resources to absorb such losses over a two-year period. The assessment process is expected to be 
completed by the end of April 2009. 
 
February 26, 2009 
The FDIC announces that the number of "problem banks" increased from 171 institutions with $116 billion of assets at the end of the third quarter of 2008, to 252 
insured institutions with $159 billion in assets at the end of fourth quarter of 2008. The FDIC also announces that there were 25 bank failures and five assistance trans-
actions in 2008, which was the largest annual number since 1993. 
 
Fannie Mae reports a loss of $25.2 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008, and a full year 2008 loss of $58.7 billion. Fannie Mae also reports that on February 25, 2009, 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency submitted a request for $15.2 billion from the Treasury Department under the terms of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement in order to eliminate Fannie Mae's net worth deficit as of December 31, 2008. 
 
February 27, 2009 
The Treasury Department announces its willingness to convert up to $25 billion of Citigroup preferred stock issued under the Capital Purchase Program into common 
equity. The conversion is contingent on the willingness of private investors to convert a similar amount of preferred shares into common equity. Remaining Treasury 
and FDIC preferred shares issued under the Targeted Investment Program and Asset Guarantee Program would be converted into a trust preferred security of greater 
structural seniority that would carry the same 8% cash dividend rate as the existing issue. 
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announces changes in its risk-based assessment system and a 20 basis point emergency special assessment on in-
sured depository institutions to be collected on September 30, 2009. 
 
The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total of $394.9 million in preferred stock from 28 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
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